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ABSTRACT 
 
Transferable Rights in a Recreational Fishery: 
 An Application to the Red Snapper Fishery in the Gulf of Mexico. (May 2007) 
Hwa Nyeon Kim, B.A., Korea University; 
M.A., Korea University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Wade L. Griffin 
                                                                    Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
 
 
Overfishing of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico has significantly increased 
lately. A major regulation to reduce the overfishing is Total Allowable Catches (TAC) in 
combination with a season closure. The restrictions on entry lead to an inefficient 
outcome, however, because the resource is not used by the fishermen who value it the 
most. As an alternative to restricting entry, transferable rights (TR) programs are being 
increasingly considered. Under a TR program, a market is created to trade a right to use 
a resource and the total benefits of the participants are maximized through such a trade.  
The principal objective of this dissertation is to comprehensively assess 
economic and biological consequences of the red snapper fishery for the TR program. 
To date the literature lacks sufficient discussion of how recreational TR programs would 
function. I, therefore, propose an economically desirable institutional framework for the 
TR program in the recreational fishery. I draw some lessons from hunting programs and 
applications of other TR programs to find better schemes for the TR program in the 
recreational fishery.  
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This dissertation uses theoretical and empirical models as well as institutional 
settings to develop the TR program. A theoretical model is provided to investigate which 
unit of measurement for the TRs is preferable. For empirical models I first estimate an 
empirically based recreation demand that incorporates TR permit demand and then 
develop a simulation submodel using the estimated demand. I find price instruments, 
such as fees or TR programs, are very efficient to reduce fishing trips but they also lead 
to distributional impacts on trips by low income (or low cost) anglers. Partial simulation 
results indicate that an efficiency benefit of the TR program would be significant 
because recreational trip demand in the current closed season is not trivial.  
I conclude that the TR program in the recreational fishery will economically and 
biologically provide a great deal of merit to reduce the overfishing situation and a 
substantial efficiency gain to Gulf anglers. Some institutional barriers, especially from 
the large transaction cost can also be overcome if electronic systems or the Internet are 
used. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Congestion and overfishing are serious issues in marine fisheries across the 
globe, and while commercial fishing is often blamed, there is increasing recognition that 
recreational fisheries are contributing to these problems. Recreational fishing may also 
play a role in a solution to these problems (Coleman et al. 2004). For example, the red 
snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico has been overfished due to excess fishing effort by 
both commercial and recreational sectors. Red snapper stocks have declined since the 
early 1970s (Goodyear and Phares 1990) and the spawning potential ratio for red 
snapper is estimated at about 1%, far below the critically overfished level of 20% 
(MRAG Americas 1997). The decline in the red snapper populations has had direct 
economic consequences in the commercial and recreational fishery.  
The overfishing situation in the recreational sector has become more apparent. 
Recreational effort targeted toward red snapper stocks has increased substantially in 
recent years. In only a few years the number of charter vessels increased by 149% and 
charter angler trips increased by 188% (GMFMC 1999a). As a result, recreational 
harvests of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico have often exceeded total allowable 
catches (TAC) by significant margins under the existing regulations.  
 
 
This dissertation follows the style of Land Economics. 
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This in turn has also prevented recreation anglers from sustaining a quality fishing 
experience (Sutinen and Johnston 2003). Recreational red snapper fisheries are closed 
periodically as a way to ensure total harvests do not exceed the TAC. In 2001 a 
moratorium was also established on recreational reef fish permits. While restrictions on 
entry can be effective in reducing fishing pressure, they lead to an inefficient allocation 
of effort. Such regulations are equivalent to quantity rationing schemes, which have a 
negative stigma among economists because they may lead to inefficient resource 
allocation and encourage wasteful rent-seeking behavior.  
As an alternative to restricting entry, transferable rights (TR) programs are being 
increasingly considered in fisheries across the globe. TR programs have been used to 
address air and water pollution. Under a TR program, rights to use a resource or emit a 
pollutant can be traded in a market. Many studies such as Montgomery (1972), Anderson 
(1995), and Carlson et al. (2000) have shown that market-based systems are more 
efficient than command and control systems because a TR program maximizes the total 
benefits of the trading participants, regardless of buyer or seller, through transactions of 
the rights.  
In the case of fisheries, TR programs have been implemented with individual 
transferable quota (ITQs) or Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) systems. The way these 
TR systems work is very simple. Suppose there is a fisherman (angler) who is allocated 
a right to catch 10 fish. If the fisherman would like to increase his right (or quota) to 
fish, he can enter the market and purchase more rights, similar to buying some fishing 
equipment in the store. Once he gets the right to catch fish, he may do so at any time or 
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until the right is expired. This means that he does not have to race to catch the fish 
before other fishermen catch them. Because the rights can be transferable to any 
fisherman who wants to fish more, the right ends up being used by the fishermen who 
value it the most. 
The need to study the use of transferable quotas in the for the Gulf’s red snapper 
fishery has recently been noted by the GMFMC’s Socioeconomic Panel (GMFMC 
1999b). However, examples of TRs in recreational fisheries are few, and the literature 
appears to be limited. While a number of nations have used transferable quota systems 
for the commercial sector, including Canada, Iceland, Australia, and New Zealand, the 
Alaska Halibut charter Individual Fishing Quota appears to be the only recreational TR 
program in the U.S.1   
The principal objective of this dissertation is to analyze the possible use of TRs 
in the red snapper recreational fisheries in the Gulf of Mexico. The overall goal of this 
dissertation is to comprehensively assess the biological and economic consequences of 
the red snapper fishery for the TR program and compare the TR program with other 
management policies. The biological effects will be measured in terms of the red 
snapper spawning stock by the target year. The positive net present value of surplus 
(consumer and producer) is used to assess the economic effects for the red snapper TR 
program and for its comparison to other policies. This criterion implies that a policy is 
preferable if its net present value of total surplus is greater than that of other policies. In 
                                                 
1 Currently, a few federal ITQ/IFQ programs exist in the United States: for surf clams and ocean 
quohogs in Mid-Atlantic and New England waters; for wreckfish along the South Atlantic coast; 
and for halibut and sablefish in Alaskan waters (FAO 2001). 
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addition, a policy is regarded as the most preferable one over other policies if its present 
value of total surplus is the largest.  
To conduct the analysis, we propose an economically desirable framework for 
TR implementation, estimate mode-specific recreation trip demand, and find market 
clearing price under TR program. Fishing modes used in this dissertation include head, 
charter, and private boats, and fishing in shore. This dissertation focuses on an 
application for the recreational TR system because to date the literature is lacking a 
fully developed model of how recreational TR program would function. 2  In this 
dissertation I will, therefore, consider the potential to use TR program to overcome 
recent difficulties of the recreational red snapper sector. 
The specific objectives of the dissertation will be: 
(i) To analyze economically desirable institutions and structures to implement TR 
programs in recreational fisheries. 
(ii) To develop a model for the TRs in recreational fisheries. The model of the study, 
however, will center attention on different unit alternatives such as fish-based, day-
based, and pound-based permits. 
(iii) To develop an empirically based recreational trip demand that can be linked to a TR 
permit demand. 
(iv) To develop a general framework and a simulation submodel to assess the economic 
and biological impacts of the TR program. 
                                                 
2 Commercial ITQs will be studied only to calibrate General Bioeconomic Fisheries Simulation 
Model (GBFSM). 
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The organization of the remaining parts of the dissertation will be as follows. 
Chapter II will address a background on the use of TRs in fisheries and highlight the 
limited experience with rights-based programs in recreational fisheries. A brief overview 
will be provided with the specific rules that govern recreational fishing for red snapper 
in the Gulf of Mexico. This overview is important for determining how a new approach 
to regulating recreational fishing will most easily be implemented and accepted when 
building on existing institutions.3 Chapter II also will address the critical design issues 
that must be answered if TRs are to be set up for the recreational fisheries.  
In chapter III, an analytical model of the TR program for the recreational sector 
under different measurement alternatives will be developed and be compared in terms of 
fishing days, the amount of fish landed per trip, and the angler’s utility. This helps 
address which unit of the TR permit is preferred using specific functional forms for 
utility and harvesting functions, and various combinations of the parameters. Chapter IV 
will discuss the recreational trip demand model and will make an application to the Gulf 
of Mexico recreational fishery. With fully developed TR models, chapter V will address 
an economic and biological impact of the TR policy using a General Bioeconomic 
Fisheries Simulation Model (GBFSM). The conclusions of this study will be given in 
chapter VI. 
                                                 
3 This dissertation uses the word institutions in this paper to describe “the rules and conventions 
that define choice sets from which individuals, firms, households, and other decision-making 
units choose courses of action” (Bromley 1989, p. 39) 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IN TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present an overview of the conceptual framework in 
transferable rights (TR) and the existing regulations surrounding recreational fishery 
management. Should transferable permits become legal, they offer the potential to 
increase overall economic efficiency in both commercial and recreational fisheries by 
making it possible for the fishermen who value the resource the most to harvest the fish. 
However, before a system of TRs could be used, there are new variables that need to be 
considered and questions that must be answered. This chapter will focus on developing a 
conceptual foundation for the recreational TR system because the literature lacks 
sufficient discussion of how recreational ITQs would function.4 We provide an overview 
of market-based management and then discuss in general terms the advantages of a TR 
approach to management. We also draw some lessons from hunting programs and 
applications of TRs in other areas. This chapter, therefore, considers the potential to use 
TR program to overcome recent difficulties of the recreational red snapper sector. 
 
 
                                                 
4 The basic theory behind ITQs in the commercial fisheries has been established since Clark 
(1980) and there is a rich literature that has studied the theoretical and institutional 
characteristics of these policies.  
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Rights Based Management of Recreational Fisheries 
Transferable Rights - Background 
In general, TRs have been studied in depth.5 Most attention has been paid to 
environmental TR markets to control air or water pollution. The basic principle in any 
TR program is that a limited number of rights to use a public resource (such as air 
quantity or a fishery) are made available to users. There is strong evidence that market-
based systems can be more efficient than command and control systems, in which 
operation sources have less flexibility (see Repetto 2001). TRs offer the potential to 
increase overall economic efficiency by making it possible for the fishermen who value 
the resource the most to harvest the fish.  
As with any market, a TR market will function properly if the property rights are 
“complete.” Hanley, Shogren, and White (1997) elaborate: 
“Markets will be complete when traders can costlessly create a well-
defined property rights system such that a market will exist to cover any 
exchange necessary. This well-defined property rights system represents a 
set of entitlements that define the owner’s privileges and obligations … 
(p. 24).  
More specifically, they state that the use of a resource will be efficient if the 
rights are comprehensively assigned, exclusive, transferable, and secure.  Because TRs 
                                                 
5 In fisheries, the theory is spelled out by, e.g., Clark (1990) and Anderson (1995). 
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markets are purposefully created by government, it is particularly important that these 
characteristics be taken into account in their creation. 
When applied to fisheries, TR instruments are referred to as individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) or individual fishing quotas (IFQ). The general benefits of TR 
programs in fisheries are discussed by Scott (1989).  He identifies three ways that ITQs 
can be an improvement over existing regulations. The first of these is the advantage 
relative to the regulation of gear types. When a quota is used, administrators need not 
concern themselves with gear, net type and so on, but instead focus on the issue of 
concern: the long-run management of the stock. Second, a quota system removes the 
incentive for a “race to the fish.” “Far from being a racetrack under close official 
supervision, [with quotas] a fishery may take on the appearance of a common rangeland, 
with the owners replacing fishery wardens in checking on each other” (Scott 1989, p. 
28). Third, a quota system can be preferred in the management of mixed stocks. As a 
caveat to this general enthusiasm for ITQs, Clark et al. (forthcoming) have shown that if 
fishermen anticipate the introduction of an ITQ at some time in the future, all of the 
economic advantages of an ITQ program can be dissipated by excessive entry into the 
program in the pre-ITQ period. 
A number of nations use transferable quota systems in their commercial fisheries 
including Iceland, New Zealand, and Australia (FAO, 2001). Batstone and Sharp (1999) 
provide a thorough review of the New Zealand program of ITQs, which captures most of 
the important aspects of ITQs. The programs began in 1986 and separate ITQ programs 
have been established for a number of species and regions.  The initial allocations were 
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designated in quantities of allowed catch based on historical harvests, but these were 
converted to a percentage of the TAC for each fishery in 1990. Batstone and Sharp find 
evidence that the programs have been quite successful in adding economic value.  For 
example, between 1987 and 1995, the sale price of a permanent right to participate in the 
area 1 snapper fishery (SNA1) had increased over four-fold and the lease price about 
doubled.  This suggests significant increase in the value of the fishing right to the 
fishermen despite the fact that the total allowable catch changed little in the period. 
Moreover, the sale price increased much more than the lease price, indicating a 
substantial increase in optimism about future profitability in the fishery.  Batstone and 
Sharp also discuss the numerous practical challenges to implementing an ITQ; from 
recognizing historical rights of the Maori, to managing fisheries outside the ITQ system, 
implementing an ITQ program is not an easy or costless endeavor. 
Consistent with the New Zealand experience, Scott emphasizes that a quota 
system is not a substitute for regulation, but instead requires reinforcement from 
government and substantial oversight.  In principle, “if the individual quotas exist, their 
owners can at some cost contract with each other to coordinate them, to perform what 
are now regarded as government functions (p. 29).”  In practice and at least in the short 
run, government oversight is critical. 
  
Experience with Transferable Rights in Recreational Fisheries 
The National Research Council (1999) recommended that attention should be 
given to the implications of recreational participation in fisheries, and to consider the 
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potential application of ITQs in recreational fisheries. The literature and experience with 
TR in recreational fisheries, however, appears to be quite limited. Sharp (1998) provided 
some initial ideas about how a recreational TR program might be structured and 
addressed some of the practical issues regarding allocation and monitoring.  Sutinen et 
al. (2002) and Sutinen and Johnston (2003) provide more in depth discussion and discuss 
the existing examples of such programs. 
Sutinen et al. (2002) study in detail the program proposed for the Alaska halibut 
fishing since it is “the sole U.S. template for the design of joint commercial-recreational 
rights-based management” (p.9). In response to the success of IFQ management in the 
commercial sector, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC) approved 
an IFQ program for the halibut charter fleet in Southeast and South-central Alaska on 
April 14, 2001. However, as of June 2006 the program has not been implemented 
because there are some practical issues to be solved. The IFQ program is expected to 
replace the Guideline Harvest Level (GHL) program proposed by the NPFMC in 
February 2000 (NPFMC, 2001a).  
The NPFMC report summarizes major features of the approved charter IFQ 
program as follows (2001a): the program does not change the 2-fish daily bag limit or 
the 2-day possession limit for charter anglers. The charter quotas are issued to charter 
owners, or to people who leased a vessel from an owner and who carried clients in 1998 
or 1999 and 2000. The Charter IFQ is allocated 125% of the average 1995-99 charter 
harvests, but these allocations may grow over time.  The charter IFQ would be integrated 
into the existing commercial IFQ program and would be equal to about 13% of the 
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combined commercial and charter quota in Southeast Alaska and about 14% of the 
combined commercial and charter quota in South-Central Alaska (NPFMC, 2001a). 
Several additional elements of the charter IFQ program are included in the 
summary of NPFMC (2001a) addressing practical issues such as measurement unit of 
TRs, transfer between commercial IFQ and the charter IFQ, and limitation of the Alaska 
charter IFQ program:  
• The proposed unit of recreational IFQs is the number of fish, in keeping with current 
regulations.  
• Charter quota shares may not be sold to the commercial sector but commercial 
shares, which are issued in pounds, may be transferred to the charter sector, 
translating pounds to fish based on average weight.  
• The program does not affect non-charter recreational anglers.  
The charter industry has indicated concern that the IFQ system would increase 
charter fishing prices and about enforcement because traditional methods used to enforce 
commercial IFQs, might not be directly applicable to the recreational sector (Sutinen et 
al. 2002).  
As with any TR program, there are many practical issues that must be addressed 
and these are evident in the minutes of the NPFMC’s committees (NPFMC 2001b and 
NPFMC 2003a). For example, in 2001, enforcement issues such as prior notice of 
landings, offload window, vessel clearance requirement, and shipment report were 
considered (NPFMC, 2001a). The NPFMC submitted the analysis of the charter IFQ 
program to NMFS in May, 2003 and the following approval process was anticipated: 
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Secretary of Commerce adoption in 2004; program development by NMFS in 2005 
including calculation, distribution, and appeals; and one year delay between the issuance 
of quota and fishing to examine the geographic distribution of quota in 2006.  It is 
anticipated that the Alaska halibut charter IFQs may be in effect in 2007 (NPFMC 
2003b), although Criddle (2006) reports that the program was rescinded and, therefore, 
will not be implemented. 
The Alaska halibut charter IFQ program is an important example because, 
despite the fact that it will not be implemented, it was the first attempt to implement TRs 
in recreational fisheries. As IFQ programs are developed in other regions, the design 
issues addressed in this program will provide valuable lessons about issues of initial 
allocation, unit of rights, and transferability between sectors. 
 
Wildlife Market – Recreational Hunting and Fishing 
As noted above, there are few examples of recreational fishing TRs. In this 
section, some applicable lessons from all the wildlife resource markets including hunting 
are explored. The use of wildlife resources is often dependent on market forces, which 
implies that demand and supply work for determining an allocation of wildlife services 
through the market clearing price of the service. The wildlife market is a big part of the 
economy in US. According to 2001 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife 
Associated Recreation (US Fish and Wildlife Service 2002), anglers spent $35.6 billion 
in 2001 including other trip expenditures such as licenses, stamps, tags, and permits 
which cost anglers nearly $0.6 billion. In the case of hunting, of the $20.6 billion spent 
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by hunters in 2001, other trip expenses such as licenses, stamps, tags, permits were $0.7 
billion (3.4 percent of all hunting expenses). Hunting and fishing are similar 
representative examples of outdoor leisure in that permits/licenses for both activities are 
required. Because of the similarity of market mechanisms between hunting and fishing, 
investigating specific wildlife markets will help a newly developed TR market in 
recreational fishing to be successfully implemented by providing prosperous schemes. 
     
Hunting Permit Market 
Although there is a lack of examples of TR program in recreational fishing, 
lessons about the management of a potential fishing TR program can be drawn from the 
experience with TRs for hunting. Among hunting permit markets, the Kansas 
nonresident deer hunting program is noteworthy because permits are transferable. 
Before 2000, a limited number of nonresident hunting permits for deer were 
drawn only to non-resident hunters by lottery. In 2000, Kansas began issuing about half 
of the nonresident deer hunting permits to residential landowners and tenants/managers. 
Although hunting takes place on private land, the deer that roam the land are a publicly 
held resource and it is the right to exploit that resource that is distributed in the Kansas 
program. The notable feature in the new deer hunting permit is transferability. 
Recipients of the permits can use the permit for themselves or transfer the permits to 
another hunter. All transfers must be reported to the Kansas Department of Wildlife and 
Parks (KDWP) main office by mailing a transfer form or through online processing. 
Because the dates of the specific season are assigned, there is a limited duration on the 
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permits, meaning that permits cannot be stored for future use. This new TR program set 
up well established property rights that create a competitive market in recreational 
hunting (Taylor and Marsh 2003).  Unlike some hunting lotteries, those who are granted 
a right in the Kansas lottery are required to make a significant payment, equal to $322 in 
2006.  
The introduction of this program drastically increased demand for non-residence 
permits. Table 2.1 shows data from Marsh and Taylor (2002) associated with permits 
available, the number of applications, and permits drawn. Notice the change that 
occurred in 2000 was accompanied by a substantial increase in the number of permits 
available; to nearly 15,000 in 2000 before dropping back to 7,800 and 7,500 in 2001 and 
2002. These figures are more than double the 1999 number.  Between 1999 and 2002 
there was also a three-fold increase in the number of applicants, suggesting that the value 
of the permits grew substantially between 1999 and 2002. 
 
TABLE 2.1 
Kansas Department of Wildlife and Parks Nonresident Deer Draw Data 
Year Permits Available Number of Applicants Permits Drawn 
1999 3,476 5,041 3,199 
2000 14,987 8,519 8,139 
2001 7,804 12,440 7,793 
2002 7,581 16,991 7,596 
Source: Marsh and Taylor (2002) 
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Although the state collects fees from lottery winners, recipients of the rights have 
an opportunity to profit by selling permits to hunters. Based on a 2002 KDWP survey of 
hunters, Taylor and Marsh (2003) report that the mean price of non-residence deer 
hunting permits for all hunting modes was $760.13, which is high compared with the 
cost of a permit in the random draw lottery to the landowners of $205.5 during this 
period.  However, the sales price was often bundled with other services including access 
to the land, guide services, etc. Using Taylor and Marsh’s regression analysis evaluated 
at the mean of all variables other than guide services, we find that on average hunters 
who did not pay for guide services paid $656 for the permit, further reduced to $82 if 
they made use of land that did not require negotiating access with the landowner.  Based 
on this analysis, it appears that the hunting rights alone had an average value of about 
$573.  The resale market for these permits appears to be quite active. Although in the 
sample period only 2% of the licenses were purchased via the Internet, it is now possible 
to find a number of permits for sale on , indicating that the market is becoming much 
more fluid. Still, the web site of the Mid-America Hunting Association 
(http://www.mahadeer.com/, 8/17/2006) reports that hunters can obtain permits from the 
secondary market at low cost, though “time frame to shop for a tag is much longer.”  The 
market has changed since 2002; in 2006 the supply of permits for a number of regions in 
the state exceeded demand and there were surplus permits available from the state at the 
fixed price of $322.  At least for those areas, it is unlikely that 2006 permits will sell for 
much above the government set price. 
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Aspects of TRs are also present in several other hunting programs in the U.S. that 
provide incentives to voluntarily conserve huntable species. California and Colorado 
were the first two states to implement incentive-based programs in hunting, California in 
1984 and Colorado in 1985. California’s Private Lands Wildlife Management Program 
(PLM) allows landowners to increase the bag limits on their land or to sell tags or 
permits directly to hunters. To qualify, landowners must improve wildlife habitat. 
Colorado’s Ranching for Wildlife Program is similar to California’s PLM. Landowners 
can raise hunting quotas on their land and achieve revenues from fee hunting after they 
agree to adopt state-specified habitat management guidelines (Freese and Trauger 2000).  
Texas is thought of as one of the most remarkable fee-hunting regions in U.S. 
because more than half of the ranches in Texas offer fee hunting (Freese and Trauger 
2000). In 1998, Steinbach et al. estimate that Texas landowners earned $100-300 million 
from hunting fees and current levels are expected to be much greater. Fee hunting on 
private land in Texas might advance biodiversity as owners attempt to raise revenues by 
increasing the number of huntable species (Teer 1997). These fee-based hunting 
programs in these states grant rights to sell or lease to private landowners and 
consequently encourage conservation in habitats and species. 
Although some features of the hunting programs may not be directly applicable 
to TRs for fishing, the programs reviewed in this section provide some good lessons. 
Like fishing, hunting involves the exploitation of a public wildlife resource for personal 
recreation. Like fishing, observing the participation of every participant is difficult, 
though in both cases licenses are required which can be used to obtain information that 
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will make the market function more smoothly. Although policy makers are usually 
reluctant to create opportunities for profits from public resources, the Kansas program 
encourages such profit making. At the same time, however, the government set price has 
increased prices so that larger shares of the rents are now captured by the state.  The 
Kansas program may have been more politically palatable because it applied to non-
resident; no similar market exists for the resident permits. The Colorado and California 
programs are useful examples of how TR programs can create incentives for 
conservation. Finally, the experience in Texas demonstrates that it is possible to have a 
nearly complete free-market approach to hunting rights. It appears that at least some of 
these markets are functioning with relatively low transaction costs, evidenced by trading 
being carried out on the Internet.  
 
Recreational Fishing Market 
Recreational fishing markets are found mostly regarding fishing licenses, stamps, 
and tags for big fish. As mentioned earlier, $0.7 billion was spent in 2001 to buy 
licenses, stamps, and tags. Although these are restrictedly transferable from the state 
governments or legitimate agents (e.g., mostly big groceries and outdoor stores, to 
fishermen), these markets have been well managed. The Tarpon tag program used by 
some states is most similar to a form of IFQs/ ITQs that are currently proposed. For 
example, Alabama Tarpon tags can be purchased at $51 per fish. Unless a person 
purchases a tarpon tag, he is not allowed to kill, possess, and harvest tarpon from the 
public waters of the state of Alabama. The tag is valid for one year from date of 
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purchase. However, this program is not commensurable with a real market since 
transferability and feasibility is not perfectly acquired in these markets.  
In spite of underdeveloped right-based markets in recreational quotas/permits, a 
quasi-market in the private sector has been created by establishing nonprofit 
organizations such as Trout Unlimited. Individuals interested in conserving fish and fish 
habitat can do so by investing in nonprofit organizations. For example the North Atlantic 
Salmon Fund in Iceland, Greenland, spent approximately $6 million to purchase more 
than 4,000 tons of commercial quotas, between 1989 and 1998 (Freese and Trauger 
2000).  
We have explored market-based tools to manage wildlife resources such as 
hunting and fishing. The use of wildlife resources is thought of as a privately provided 
public good (not free to use). Because it is hard to assign well defined property rights for 
wildlife resources including fisheries, it is more complicated to use the market-based 
mechanism in wildlife management than in normal products such as concert tickets. 
Nevertheless, considering wildlife resources from a market perspective may provide a 
better means to measure the value of the wildlife services and help to find an efficient 
economic solution to conserve wildlife activities. We now turn specifically to the 
practical questions of implementation that must be addressed if a TR program is to be 
designed for a marine recreational fishery. 
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Existing Institutional Structure 
Before a TR program for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper fishery can be 
considered, it is important to first be aware of the existing institutional structure. 
 
Red Snapper Recreational Fishing in the Gulf of Mexico  
Red snapper recreational fishing regulations are based on the Reef Fish Fishery 
Management Plan (RFFMP) which was developed by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery 
Management Council (GMFMC) in 1984. It has been revised by 21 regulatory 
amendments to overcome overfishing and to pursue sustainable fisheries in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Until now, the main control tool for red snapper fisheries has been the total 
allowable catch (TAC). GMFMC (2000) defines the TAC as “a level of fishing intended 
to obtain optimum yield (OY) and to prevent overfishing, or to follow a recovery plan 
when a stock is overfished. Annual changes to the TAC or measures to attain it are 
implemented through a regulatory amendment.” The Council sets a level of TAC from 
within the acceptable biological catch (ABC) range which is intended to stop overfishing 
or achieve sustainability of the fisheries. 
Table 2.2 presents changes in the regulations that govern red snapper fishing in 
the Gulf of Mexico from 1991 to 2003. The official TAC of the recreational sector was 
1.96 million lbs in 1990 and increased to 4.47 million lbs in 1996 where it remains 
today. The TAC was not enforced until 1997 through recreational sector (Hood and 
Steele 2004). Recreational harvests of red snapper are estimated to have often exceeded 
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the TAC by significant margins, while commercial sector correspond with the TAC 
(Sutinen and Johnston 2003). The recreational red snapper fisheries reveal patterns in 
which open days have decreased over time. The first closure of the fishery took place in 
1997 when the season was ended in late November. From 1990 to 1996, Gulf of Mexico 
red snapper fishery open days were 365 but decreased to 330 days in 1997 and only 194 
days in 2003 (Hood and Steele 2004). The decreasing season length is the most 
important trend in recreational red snapper management. 
 
 
TABLE 2.2 
Changes in Recreational Red Snapper Regulations 
Year 
Size Limit 
(Inches, 
Total 
Length) 
Daily Bag Limit 
(Number of Fish) 
Season Length
(days) 
Recreational 
Allocation/Quota 
(Million lbs) 
Recreational 
Harvest 
(Million lbs) 
1993 13 7 365 2.94 5.29 
1994 14 7 365 2.94 4.26 
1995 15 5 365 2.94 3.25 
1996 15 5 365 4.47 3.57 
1997 15 5 330 4.47 5.41 
1998 15 4 272 4.47 5.76 
1999 15 4 240 4.47 5.51 
2000 16 4 194 4.47 3.92 
2001 16 4 194 4.47 4.52 
2002 16 4 194 4.47 5.32 
2003 16 4 194 4.47 4.58 
2004 16 4 194 4.47 5.08  
2005 16 4 194 4.47 4.59 
Source: History of red snapper management in federal waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico 
-1984-2004: 2004 Red Snapper SEDAR, NOAA Fisheries, SEDAR7-DW-40 
(Hood and Steele, 2004) Harvests data for 2004 and 2005 are from Vivian 
Matters (Personal Communication, 8/15/2006). 
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Two additional regulations used in the red snapper recreational fishing are size 
limits and bag limits.6 Recent regulatory amendments show a pattern of smaller bag 
limits and increasing minimum size in the recreational sector. The RFFMP in 1984 
established a minimum size limit of 13 inches total length (TL) for red snapper with the 
exceptions that for hire boats were exempted until 1987 and each angler could keep 5 
undersize fish (GMFMC 2000). As of 2005 the Council has set the recreational red 
snapper bag limit at 4 fish and set the recreational red snapper minimum size limit at 16 
inches TL. 
Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of recreational trips recorded in each of six 
two month “waves” that were recorded in the 1997 Marine Recreational Fishery 
Statistics Survey (MRFSS). The MRFSS data do not measure the relative portions of 
angler participation throughout the year, but it is clear that fishermen do indeed 
participate year round.7 The figure also shows the dates that the red snapper fishery has 
been closed in recent years and we see that the current closure dates, between November 
1 and April 20, correspond to times when many anglers used to fish. It appears, 
therefore, that the closure is inefficient because anglers cannot fish in the months that 
they would prefer. 
 
                                                 
6 These fishing regulations are most commonly used in recreational fisheries. A bag limit is a 
mandatory restriction that places an upper limit on the number of fish an angler can retain during 
a fishing trip. A size limit is a regulation such that an angler can retain a fish only of it exceeds a 
minimum size. 
7 The data presented include all gulf fishing trips. The 1997 MRFSS data include 42 observations 
from anglers who targeted red snapper. Trips by these anglers are also distributed quite evenly 
throughout the year.   
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Percentages of Recreational Trips in 1997 MRFSS
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug Sep-Oct Nov-Dec
closedclosed open
(Apr.21 - Oct.31)
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Open Season in 2005 and Distribution of Recreational Trips in 1997 
 
Fishing Regulations and Rules in the Gulf States 
Table 2.3 presents a summary of the regulations that govern red snapper fishing 
in the Gulf of Mexico in 2005.  It is notable that the fishery is already under relatively 
tight restrictions in terms of the size and bag limits, and season closures. The 
introduction of a TR program in the fishery would amount to a requirement that anglers 
possess an additional authorization in order to fish for red snapper. 
 In all states in the Gulf, anglers are currently required to hold a license, but it 
appears that only in Texas is an additional red snapper stamp required, and that stamp is 
valid for the entire red-snapper season. Hence, the introduction of a requirement that 
anglers purchase a right to fish on a given day, would be rather new. However, short-
term rights are not unfamiliar in management of hunting and fishing as discussed above. 
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Three- and five-day non-resident hunting and fishing rights are routinely issued in many 
states, often at rather substantial fees.8  Although residents may resist the loss of their 
entitlement to fish whenever they choose, the implementation of such a program would 
not be entirely new and enforcement could be handled in the same fashion that license 
requirements are currently enforced.  
 
 
Critical Questions in the Designing a Transferable Rights Market for a 
Recreational Fishery 
In this section we will consider ten practical questions that must be answered 
before a TR program could be established for a recreational fishery. The answers to 
these questions are not independent, but each must be addressed. Two or more 
alternatives exist for each question and none have obvious answers.  We close in the 
following section with a proposed program for a TR program for the Gulf of Mexico 
Red Snapper (GRS, hereafter) fishery that answers these questions. All the questions 
elaborated in this section are not testable hypotheses but we provide the most preferable 
schemes after reviewing some lessons of existing market-based programs and 
considering the characteristics of recreational fishing in the end of the section.   
                                                 
8 For example, Arkansas charges $100 for a Nonresident 3-Day All Game Hunting License 
(http://www.arkansasstripers.com/arkansas-hunting-fishing-license.htm). 
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TABLE 2.3 
Recreational Saltwater Fishing Regulations 2005 
 LICENSE STAMP SIZE LIMIT BAG LIMIT SEASON g) 
FEDERAL a) State License Required  16 in. TL 4 / person April 21- 
 October 31 
TEXAS b) annual: 1yr (R & NR) Saltwater Fishing 15 in. TL 4 / person  
 trip: 3day,14day(R) & 5day(NR) Stamp Endorsement " 
 lifetime-n/a Required  
FLORIDA c) annual: 1yr (R & NR) & 5yr (R) 20 in. TL(Atlantic) 2 / person (Atlantic)  
 trip-3day, 7day (NR) 16 in. TL (Gulf) 4 / person (Gulf) " 
 lifetime: (R only)  
MISSISSIPPI d) annual: 1yr (R & NR) 16 in. TL 4 / person  
 trip-3day (NR) " 
 lifetime-n/a  
LOUISIANA e)  annual- 1yr (R & NR) 16 in. TL 4 / person  
 trip: 1day,4day (NR) " 
 lifetime: (R only)  
ALABAMA f) annual-1yr (R & NR) 16 in. TL 4 / person  
 trip-7day (R & NR) " 
 lifetime-n/a  
Sources :a. Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council(http://www.gulfcouncil.org) 
b. Texas parks and wildlife Department(http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us) 
c. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (http://myfwc.com) 
d. Mississippi Department of Marine Resources (http://www.dmr.state.ms.us) 
e. Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (http://www.wlf.state.la.us) 
f. Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources -Marine Resources Div. 
(http://www.dcnr.state.al.us/MR) 
g. Vary annually  
Note :  R - Resident, NR - Non-Resident, and TL - Total Length 
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How Should Transferable Rights Be Measured? 
In designing a TR program for recreational fisheries, the first question that must 
be answered is the units of measurement in which the rights will be denominated. Dales 
(1968) referred to this as the “asset-unit,” defined as “the smallest physical amount of 
the asset to which it is practicable to apply property rights” (p. 797).  In the recreational 
fishery TR program, it may be difficult to determine an asset-unit because of biological 
characteristics, i.e., fishing mortality when fish are released, and individuals’ different 
fishing preferences. However, three alternatives seem to be apparent:   
Alternative 1: Set the unit of transferable rights in number of fish retained. 
Alternative 2: Set the unit of transferable rights in pounds of caught fish. 
Alternative 3: Set the unit of transferable rights in fishing days. 
Following on Dales (1968), the question that must be asked of each of these 
options is, what is “practicable”?  To answer this there are three issues that must be 
considered: control over the biological impact of the fishing activity, monitoring and 
enforcement, and transaction costs.9 
Under alternative 1, a single right would grant its holder a right to harvest one 
fish (presumably of legal size if size limits are retained). This alternative is the approach 
that has the most in common with the TR programs discussed above.  For example, the 
Alaskan halibut program is specified in number of fish and the Kansas hunting program 
                                                 
9 In chapter III we carry out a theoretical comparison of the welfare consequences of alternative 
right specifications. In that analysis we find that there is no clear winner across the three 
alternatives. 
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is for a single deer. Although there is some uncertainty due to the size and age of the fish 
that might be harvested, a permit based on number of fish relates quite well to the 
biological impact that anglers impose on the fish stock. Monitoring and enforcement 
would need to be addressed in a way that ensures easy compliance without creating 
perverse incentives. As with bag limits, a right denominated in fish creates a moral 
hazard problem. This problem occurs because if a recreational angler buys such a right 
permit he or she has an incentive to discard caught fish (that may not survive) so that the 
right is essentially used several times. These issues are not a major problem in big-game 
hunting.  But it would be much more difficult in a deep sea fishery with anglers regularly 
catching several fish and several species in a single day. On the other hand, Sutinen et al. 
(2002) point out that the rights granted to the recreational fishery in the Alaskan Halibut 
program are denominated in fish to be as consistent as possible with existing regulations. 
Hunting permits are routinely set as a single animal (e.g., the Maine Moose hunting 
program and Turkey permits in most states). A desirable feature of any such system 
would be that the right would need to be terminated immediately after a fish is landed by 
an angler.  However, it is not clear to us how this could be ensured in a deep sea fishery.  
Rights specified in terms of fish would need to be purchased in advance of a trip and the 
right would probably need to take a physical form such as tags used in many hunting and 
some fishing programs. Because of uncertainty about how many fish an angler will land, 
anglers would either need to have a surplus number of rights before each trip and resell 
them afterwards, or buy too few rights and essentially face a small bag limit. 
 27
Under alternative 2, rights would be stated in terms of a number of pounds. This 
approach would specify the TR in the same units as the official TAC, facilitating an 
understanding of the impact on the fishery each time the right is used.  This would also 
reduce the incentive to discard undersize fish as compared to the per-fish permit since 
these would use up less of the angler’s right. The pound-based permits will also facilitate 
transferability of rights between sectors without translating other units (fish or days) into 
pounds because most commercial ITQ/IFQ are denominated in pounds. Still, because 
most anglers will purchase relatively few permits and the stochastic nature of fishing 
exists, the limit on pounds might cause anglers to discard fish in order to come close to 
using their complete right. As with alternative 1, monitoring and enforcement would 
require that rights be purchased before a trip the problem of ensuring that an angler has 
sufficient rights would be a burden on anglers and could lead to discards once an angler 
has run out of rights.  Finally, unlike the one-fish one-right approach under alternative 1, 
there is no obvious way that an angler would terminate his or her right upon landing a 
fish. Transaction costs, therefore, are likely to be higher under this alternative. 
Under alternative 3, rights would be stated in terms of a number of days for 
fishing. This approach is the least satisfactory in terms of its relationship between rights 
used and the physical impact on the fishery since fishing mortality depends on the 
angler’s success.  If the TRs are denominated in terms of days of access to the fishery, 
then bag limits would probably need to be used to control total catch per day. As with 
TR for nonpoint pollution, this alternative essentially represents a practice-based 
allocation, with its ensuant limitations. In this case inefficiency arises because some 
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anglers may not desire a complete bag limit while others may wish to exceed that limit. 
In spite of their known inefficiencies, practice-based TRs are used when monitoring of 
actual environmental impacts is costly and incentives exist for noncompliance. This may 
be appropriate here. The use of rights stated in days of access could also have 
advantages in terms of monitoring and enforcement; the day-based right could be 
enforced in much the same way as requirements that anglers have a fishing license. 
Although anglers know that it is unlikely that their license will be checked during a day 
of fishing, they usually purchase the license before fishing because of the uncertainty as 
to whether they will be caught. A day-based right would, therefore, be used before the 
fishing day is begun.  This would mean that it could be monitored through an electronic 
tracking system in which an angler can purchase, sell, and terminate a right through the 
Internet or a toll-free telephone number. 
 
Who Should Hold Rights? 
The next question that must be answered is what organizational unit might hold 
rights. Traditionally in TR programs, rights have been primarily held by individuals, 
e.g., individual polluters or individual commercial fishermen. At first glance, one might 
assume that the answer to this question is obvious – rights should be held by anglers.  
However, Sutinen and Johnston (2003) propose a novel alternative, arguing for the use 
of Angling Management Organizations (AMOs) that would manage and distribute the 
rights back to anglers. In their proposal, AMOs, consisting of groups of anglers, would 
be allocated the rights, and they would then determine how those rights would be 
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distributed to individual anglers. They propose that anglers would purchase the right to 
fish by purchasing shares, which "may be bought and sold much like shares of 
companies" (p. 478).  
Alternative 1: Individual anglers 
Alternative 2: Angling Management Organizations 
Alternative 3: For-hire recreational sector only 
Alternative 4: Local or regional governmental authorities 
As noted by Sutinen and Johnston (2003), alternative 1 offers many advantages 
because of its connection to existing regulatory structure.  However, they raise two main 
concerns about this approach: initial allocation issues and the question of enforcement.  
The first of these will be discussed below. The latter is closely related to the units in 
which rights are stated and, as we note above, this might be reduced by using a practice-
based right, avoiding the need to monitor harvests ex post. 
The AMO option favored by Sutinen and Johnston (2003) would allocate the 
rights to groups of anglers.  The AMO could distribute the rights back to anglers, or they 
could engage in more creative management options, such as arranging lotteries of rights, 
tournaments, etc. As the holder of the rights, the AMOs would be responsible for 
monitoring harvests by anglers and it would be the AMOs rather than the anglers that 
would report actual harvests to the government.  The authors believe that this could have 
economies of scale, reducing enforcement costs. The AMO is also more likely to engage 
in activities that lead to improvements in the fishery, much like holders of ITQs 
sometimes participate in stock improvement activities (Repetto 2001). In the end, 
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however, it is individual angler behavior that must be monitored, so that unless 
responsibilities are clearly defined and the AMO is able to make better use of 
information, the AMO approach may simply add an additional level of bureaucracy 
without any reduction in cost. Sharp (1998) notes that when proposed in New Zealand, 
the AMO approach was not adopted in part because of its inconsistencies with legal 
authorities of management councils.  
Alternative 3, in which the TRs would be held only by the for-hire recreational 
sector, is the system that has been proposed for the Alaskan halibut fishery.  This 
approach has advantages in terms of monitoring and initial allocations. However, since 
this would leave the non-charter fishermen out of the program, it is only appropriate if 
charter boats dominate the recreational fishery.  Further, there must still be some control 
over non-charter anglers, since this approach would create an artificial cost advantage to 
non-charter fishing, which could lead to growth in that type of fishing. 
Under alternative 4 the TR would be allocated to local or regional governmental 
authorities.  These could function in much the same way as AMOs, with some of the 
same advantages. However, in many ways this is not that much different from the status 
quo and not likely to yield improvements unless the regional authorities adopt some 
form of TR program themselves.  Moreover, for migratory species, lack of enforcement 
by one governmental authority would have consequences for the other regions. 
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How Should Temporal and Spatial Elements of TRs Be Handled? 
In specifying the units of the TR, their spatial and temporal characteristics must 
also be defined. Does a recreational TR grant its holder rights to use the fishery at any 
time and in any place, or in a limited region for a limited time period.   
Alternative 1: Rights would not expire and could be used anywhere within the fishery 
Alternative 2: Rights would expire and/or would be valid only in specific subregions 
First, we consider the spatial dimension: would permits be valid in all Gulf 
waters, or would the TAC be allocated across the states or even smaller regions?  Based 
on the simplest conception of economic efficiency, economists would typically argue for 
no spatial limitation so that rights could go to those areas where the permits are most 
valuable. There are two reasons that spatial limits might be imposed.  First, there may be 
equity considerations and if, for example, the vast majority of the permits were 
purchased for use in a single state, this could adversely affect the remaining states. 
Hence, political forces may push for a fixed allocation across states. A second reason is 
biological: as pointed out by Sutinen and Johnston (2003) if rights became highly 
concentrated this could lead to localized stock depletion.  
With regard to the temporal dimension, there are two issues that must be 
resolved. First, how long a permit would be valid – e.g., would unused permits expire at 
the end of the year? There is strong evidence that such expirations would be 
counterproductive (Hahn and Hester 1989) as they would encourage use at the end of the 
year when delay would actually be preferred for both by the anglers and in terms of the 
biological health of the fishery. There is, however, precedent for a time-limited right; to 
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our knowledge in most hunting permit programs in which the duration of use is 
specified, unused permits expire at the end of the specified date and (although we are 
unable to find any valid reason) the recently proposed IFQ program for the GRS 
commercial fishery program has a similar provision. The second issue is how to control 
how long a permit would be valid for use. This is obvious if rights are specified in terms 
of a day of fishing.  But if rights were specified in terms of fish or pounds, then it is less 
clear: Suppose there is an angler who intends to use up a 10 pound permit in his trip but 
he catches only 5 pounds of fish. Can the unused 5 pound rights be valid? We see 
advantages to specifying the right as an ex ante right – i.e., a right gives you to capture 
up to one fish, though not the guarantee of that.  This approach would mean that rights 
could be tracked and exchanged electronically without the use of a physical tag.  On the 
other hand, in keeping with most hunting tag systems and commercial ITQs, quantity-
based rights would be valid until the fish are actually captured. 
 
How Should TRs Be Allocated Initially?  
The question of initial allocation is one of the most problematic and studied 
issues that must be addressed in developing any TR program. When TRs are used in 
pollution markets, it is common for rights to be “grandfathered” to sources based on 
historical emissions. However, this is not the only possibility and it may not be a 
practical alternative in the case of a recreational fishery. 
Alternative 1: Grandfathering based on historical use. 
Alternative 2: Lottery 
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Alternative 3: Auction 
Alternative 4: Federal sale (retail at fixed price) 
Under alternative 1, TRs can be initially allocated by historical catch records of 
all eligible applicants who owned or operated a vessel. Individual anglers who keep 
fishing licenses and stamps for red snapper fisheries for a certain period could obtain an 
initial allocation of the TRs. Because of the large number of anglers and the lack of 
records, this system would be very difficult. The difficulty in establishing grandfathered 
rights is one of the reasons that Sutinen and Johnston (2003) argue that rights should be 
issued to regional AMOs. An interesting aspect of grandfathering that should not be 
ignored is that the process of determining the allocation can create an incentive for 
historical users of a resource to reveal their use (Montero et al. 2002). On the other hand, 
the critique of Clark et al. (forthcoming) is specifically related to grandfathered rights 
and policy makers should watch for expansions in efforts prior to the establishment of a 
TR program with grandfathered rights. This not only determines who will receive the 
right, but can help establish a system for monitoring future use.  
Like grandfathering, if the initial allocation of TRs is established through a 
lottery the rights are typically given away at no cost to those that receive that right. This 
approach is followed in many recreational systems in which the supply of available use 
rights is less than the demand. Applicants could apply separately, perhaps at a fee, for 
access rights, or all licensed anglers could automatically be qualified.  In cases like the 
GRS fishery, in which there is a substantial presence of charter and “party” boats, a 
separate lottery to those vessels might needed to avoid too much dispersion of the rights.  
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Scrogin and Berrens (2003) note that lotteries are prevalent in the United States 
including the Maine Moose hunting permits, the Kansas nonresident deer hunting 
permits, and a New Mexico lottery system for elk harvest rights.  They emphasize that 
“since lotteries ration independently of income, they are commonly favored by the 
public due to equity concerns (p.137).” Note, however, that as in the Kansas nonresident 
hunting permit program, a lottery does not have to give the right to winners at no cost, 
but can instead give winners the right to buy that right at a non-trivial cost. 
Alternatives 1 and 2 grant the TRs to the users, (typically) at no cost.  This is not 
the only way that the initial allocation can be determined. Under alternative 3, the TRs 
permits would be initially distributed to the public through an auction. Auction 
participants could include not only individual users, but also retail shops, charter boat 
operators or groups of angler. Auctions are frequently used to transfer assets from public 
to private hands, as in timber rights and off-shore oil leases, and when the seller is 
unsure about the values that bidders are willing to pay. They also have the advantage of 
transparency, which is important in such transactions. Economic efficiency of the 
auction in the initial allocation of fisheries TRs might, however, depend on the detailed 
mechanism of the auction.  
Morgan (1995) argued that the method of initially allocating fisheries quotas will 
eventually move to auctions because quota allocation by administrative decision is 
economically inefficient. He said that auctions offer two significant advantages over 
other alternatives of resource allocation. First, the process is economically efficient due 
to readily identified market demand and appropriate price for quotas. Second, the 
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process identifies those potential users who place the highest values on fishery in 
question. Using auctions to allocate initial fisheries TRs might be better than using other 
alternatives because it identifies potential fishermen with the highest use value of the 
fisheries and maximizes revenues in an economically efficient way and facilitates the 
purchase of multiple permits by the for-hire sector. 
The final option would be to sell the licenses at a fixed price. For example, in the 
red snapper case, rights might be held throughout the year by the GMFMC or National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and sold directly to the public. A disadvantage of this 
approach is that the fixed price could create opportunities for rent-seeking behavior if the 
price chosen by the agency is too low. If the set price is too low then demand would 
exceed supply. In this case a secondary market would arise, creating opportunities for 
profiteering by those able to game the system and purchase their permits early. If a 
fixed-price approach is taken, governments may feel compelled to regulate transfers in a 
manner that diminishes the potential for the market to efficiently allocate the permits.  A 
creative adaptation to this that could overcome many of the problems would be to have a 
government price that varies in response to supply and demand. 
The first two options considered above would allocate the TR to the public at 
relatively low cost. This has been favored in many TR program as the most politically 
palatable approach.  However, it is not necessarily the only option.  The Kansas permit 
program charges relatively high prices for hunting permits, so high that in 2006 supply 
exceeded demand.  In a TR program for the GRS fishery, it is likely that prices, at least 
initially would not be exceedingly high.  
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Should Trades of TRs Be Monitored?  
With the exception of products like military weapons and dangerous chemicals, 
most goods are transacted in markets with no monitoring of each trade.  This is not true 
in many TR markets.  TRs are essentially a government granted right to exploit a public 
resource so it is usually, though not always, the case that the government must be 
informed of TR trades.  
Alternative 1: Rights could be sold and traded with agency notification 
Alternative 2: Rights could be sold and traded without agency notification 
Under alternative 1, all trades should be reported to a government agency such as 
GMFMC or NMFS. For example, in case of the Kansas nonresident deer hunting permit 
program, all transfers are processed through the KDWP main office. Alternative 2 is an 
option only if the right takes a physical form such as a card or a tag. Even if the right 
takes a physical form, enforcement of transfer restrictions would be difficult or 
impossible since there would be no monitoring of the rights permit trades. The benefit of 
notification is that it facilitates enforcement of the overall cap and allows better 
monitoring of fishing. The costs of such monitoring are related to transaction costs and 
some loss in privacy. We believe that if all trades are carried out electronically 
transaction costs might be kept low and monitoring of the program will be improved.   
 
Where Will Trade Take Place? 
Regardless of how the initial allocation of rights is made, efficiency requires that 
trades be possible.  Although economists frequently assume that a market will arise 
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naturally, in designing the market planners should consider whether they want to make 
any efforts to help that market take a specific form.   
Alternative 1:  Trades take place in retail markets 
Alternative 2:  All sales made by government  
Alternative 3: Clearing House 
Transferability of rights requires the development of a market. Under alternative 
1, retail shops would be able to sell or buy rights. These could be sporting goods stores, 
bait and tackle shops, grocery stores, etc.; or transactions might take place between 
private parties, for example through ebay. Most current shops where fishing licenses are 
sold would be a potential outlet for the sale of transferable rights. If rights take a 
physical form, then retail distributors would be a very useful.  However, to avoid 
localized scarcity, it would be helpful to have a computer generated supply of the rights 
as is done with lottery tickets. 
Under alternative 2, the rights would be sold only by government agencies. This 
would have the advantage of transparency and avoid the impression that private parties 
are profiting from a public resource. However, governments are typically not very good 
at setting prices so as to balance supply and demand in the market place; it is almost 
certain a government run market would not equate supply and demand. For example, if 
the price is set too low, then demand would exceed supply, inefficient rationing would 
result and extra-market, possibly illegal, trades would be likely.  Although it runs 
counter to most government approaches, it might be possible for the government to play 
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the role of a market maker with prices varying over time in response to supply and 
demand pressures. 
Finally, a government sanctioned, but not necessarily run, clearinghouse might 
be possible in which rights would be transacted.  This approach would only work if 
rights do not take a physical form.  In that case, all market transactions could be 
achieved through bilateral negotiations, though price information would be assisted by a 
bulletin board and notification of prices of recent trades. 
 
Will Speculation Be Allowed? 
An issue related to the two previous points is whether or not retailers and 
resellers will be allowed to sell the TRs at a profit. Fishing licenses are typically sold at a 
fixed price determined by the government with the seller usually receiving regulated 
issuance fees. Since such licenses are not scarce, this approach is reasonable. However, 
if a TAC is to be allocated through a market, efficiency requires that the price be allowed 
to vary depending on supply and demand. Occasional spikes in prices are possible in a 
market, and this could lead to public outcry and opposition to the TR system. We 
believe, however, that with the advent of ebay and similar online markets, the public is 
increasingly comfortable with the trading of a wide variety of assets and forces of supply 
and demand are more responsive than ever, which should have the effect of mitigating 
price variability. Further, there is precedent for such resale and speculation on TRs in the 
Kansas program, where the resale price charged by sellers in the 2001-2002 period was 
more than $200 higher than the price originally charged.  In Kansas this appears to have 
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occurred with little public outcry, though the fact that it is only the nonresident permits 
that are transferable might have something to do with this. 
The problem with speculation arises when individuals are able to capture a 
market and thereby make exploitative rents from sales. If a large market is considered, as 
for the GRS case, the potential for market wide monopoly power seems slight.  Under an 
AMO type structure, oligopoly power could arise, and this would need to be monitored 
if this approach is used. A more serious concern is that localized scarcity might exist if 
rights take a physical form that cannot be moved quickly from one place to the next. If, 
on a given Saturday morning, the number of anglers wishing to buy rights at a single 
location exceeds the available demand, the prices could soar rather quickly.  These kinds 
of local pressures can be avoided if rights are transacted electronically or printed by 
retailers when needed. 
 
Will the Transfer Between Sectors Be Allowed? 
Alternative 1: Transfer between commercial and recreational sectors is allowed  
Alternative 2: No trading between sectors 
The basic economic notions of efficiency suggest that unfettered trading between 
the recreational and commercial sectors should be allowed. However the transfer of TRs 
between commercial sector and recreational sector can be controversial. While 
unconstrained transfer of the rights between sectors would increase short-run net benefits 
to market participants, it can have some negative consequences. 
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First, regional depletion could occur if the purchasing sector is geographically 
concentrated. Second, there is the potential for market concentration, particularly if 
rights are grandfathered and assigned in perpetuity as is done in most ITQ programs.  
The third reason for such a restriction would be concerns about secondary impacts on 
related economic participants.  If the recreational sector purchased some of commercial 
rights, this could affect not only the fishermen, but the processing and marketing sectors 
as well.  Similar impacts on the tourism industry would occur if the trades went the other 
direction.  While in a full-employment economy such concerns have little economic 
merit, in situations of localized unemployment and/or situations with species-specific 
capital investments, such secondary impacts should not be ignored. The fourth reason, 
which is probably the most common real reason for such restrictions, is political pressure 
to protect the rights of one resource user group over those of another group. Such 
pressures are likely to come with particular force from secondary market participants 
who have nothing to gain when rights are sold. 
There is certainly a precedent for such restrictions. In the Alaska Halibut 
program, charter boat operators can purchase IFQ shares from the commercial fishery, 
but shares originally allocated to the charter sector (recreational sector) cannot be sold to 
the commercial sector (Sutinen et al. 2002).  
 
How Should Monitoring and Enforcement Be Carried Out?   
One of the central challenges of TR programs is monitoring and enforcement. 
This issue is more salient in the case of TRs than in most other markets. When physical 
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commodities are considered, if someone wants to obtain something they have little 
choice but to find a seller.  In the case of TRs, however, someone who wants to use a 
public resource may do so unless someone is monitoring their behavior to ensure that 
they have purchase the right.  In the end, the government, as the caretaker of those 
resources, must take final responsibility for ensuring that the public resource is used only 
by those that have obtained a use right. 
Closures and gear restrictions are relatively easy to enforce. By contrast, 
particularly in a multiple-species deep-see fishery such as the GRS, it would be difficult 
to ensure that all anglers fishing for red snapper have the necessary right. Sutinen and 
Johnston (2003) point out that the more disaggregated the rights are distributed, the more 
difficult monitoring becomes. In particular, they argue that the monitoring problem gives 
AMOs a distinct advantage since the unit needed to be monitored would be much 
greater. Although the AMO approach could offer some advantages in this regard, in the 
end it is the individual anglers that harvest the fish. Hence, regardless of whether the 
right is transferred directly to the angler, or the angler receives the right indirectly 
through an AMO or a local government agency, at some point individual behavior must 
be monitored. 
The system of allocation can affect monitoring in that if funds are collected, for 
example through an auction of the initial allocation, this would generate revenue that 
would be available for monitoring and the amount of money available would be 
proportional to the value of the rights. If the rights command a high price, then more 
money would be available for monitoring.  On the other hand, if the price of the rights is 
 42
low, then little revenue would be available but the incentive to fish without a permit 
would also be low.10 
 
Should Size and Bag Limits Be Retained? 
As we noted above, size and bag limits can be very inefficient devices for the 
control of total harvests. On the other hand, there are legitimate reasons for maintaining 
these restrictions based on biological factors and concerns for equity.  If rights are 
defined in terms of pounds or fish, then these rights should probably take the place of 
bag limits. If rights are defined as a day of use, then restrictions on that use would almost 
certainly be required in the form of bag limits.  In the Alaskan Halibut program, in 
which rights are defined in terms of fish landed, a bag limit is retained.  However, it 
should be recognized that bag limits provide incentives for discards and if discard 
mortality is significant then these limits can be counterproductive. In this case, therefore, 
bag limits should be set only to ensure a degree of equitability, but should not be used as 
a means to reducing total catch. 
As discussed above, size limits can be particularly problematic when used as a 
means to control harvest. Regardless of the units in which the TR is established, 
therefore, we believe that size limits should be set only to address biological concerns 
relating to recruitment, and should not be used as a means to reduce total catch. 
 
                                                 
10 Note, that some level of monitoring is necessary to avoid an equilibrium in which the price is 
low because everyone is cheating. 
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A Proposal for a Recreational TR Program in the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper 
Fishery 
We now briefly propose a system for TRs in the GRS fishery that we believe is 
implementable and would lead to substantial improvements in the management of that 
recreational fishery. We believe that recreational fisheries can be well suited for TR 
management system. Our proposal is for a system of Red Snapper TR (RSTR) and it 
would have the following characteristics: 
• RSTR would be day-based rights that must be terminated before beginning a 
fishing day. The rights would be a record on an electronically maintained registry. 
• Rights would be held by individual anglers. 
• RSTR would be not expired and would be valid to fish anywhere in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  
• The initial allocation would be carried out through all schemes. For private-rental 
boat users, multiple auctions or lotteries during the year could be used. A larger 
number of auctions might be necessary in the first years of the program, but after 
several years it may be possible to sell all rights in one or two auctions. In case of 
head boat sector which keeps recording historical harvests, grandfathering could 
be used. In case of charter sector, rights could be initially allocated to AMOs and 
then they will distribute rights to charter boat operators.   
• Since rights are electronic, monitoring of all trades would be critical.  
• Trades would take place in retail markets, through e-markets or a government 
established clearing house. 
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• No restrictions on speculation would be imposed so that the market will decide 
the clearing price of TRs. 
• At least initially, we propose that limited transfer between commercial and 
recreational sectors 
• Monitoring and enforcement should be carried out with high penalties for anglers 
fishing without a valid day right. 
•  Since we propose that rights be denominated as a day fished, bag limits would 
need to be retained, but they could be increased because they are no longer the 
principal tool used for control of total harvests.  Size limits should be used to 
address biological concerns regarding recruitment, but they should not be used as 
a device to reduce harvests.   
All these preferred and desired options could enable the newly created TR 
market to work properly and successfully. It is, however, believed that the proposed 
market for TR in recreational fishery can be treated as a real market and end up being 
close to a market for private goods. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In contrast to commercial fisheries which have been the center of ITQ studies, 
little attention has been paid to the implementation of TRs in the recreational fishery. 
This Chapter provides the background necessary to begin exploring in more detail the 
issues of how a TR program might be implemented in the red-snapper recreational 
fishery. In the chapter we have briefly summarized the issues at stake and present the 
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advantages and disadvantages of alternative solutions. These practical issues for ITQ 
programs in the recreational sector were studied based on the literature and case studies 
of successfully implemented TR programs, particularly in other areas (e.g., pollution 
credit markets and commercial ITQ systems). 
Although the use of TRs in recreational fisheries is a relatively new idea, we 
believe that it is an idea that has a great deal of merit and the institutional barriers are not 
insurmountable. In the rest of this dissertation we will take this idea one step further, 
studying the potential for such a program using theoretical and empirical models. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL MODEL OF TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS IN 
RECREATIONAL FISHERY 
 
One of the questions in chapter II was how transferable rights should be 
measured. As indicated, the possible alternatives are: the number of fish landed, the 
number of days spent fishing, and total weight (e.g., pounds) of fish landed. In this 
chapter, analytical models of three different measurement unit alternatives of TRs are 
developed and comparative statics of decision variables is done with respect to the 
permit price.  
 
Transferable Rights Under Different Unit of Measurement 
 In contrast to commercial fisheries ITQs, which profit maximization is the 
objective, TR programs for the recreational sector must be evaluated in terms of a 
representative angler’s utility maximization problem. Following Woodward and Griffin 
(2003), who adapted the standard practice in the recreation demand literature, we assume 
that an angler’s utility is a function of the number of “days” spent fishing (equivalent in 
trips), d, a composite good representing other goods purchased, 0x , the number of fish 
retained or “landed,” l, the average “size” of the retained fish, s, and the “time” per day 
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spent fishing, t. This model is not dynamic but static for a utility maximization problem 
similar to a household production model.  
 Because their utility function includes the subfunction, q, the angler’s utility 
function can be weakly separable and his or her decision of taking a fishing trip can be 
treated as a two-stage decision. After the angler chooses how many days (d) to be taken 
during the year and his other expenditures over the course of the year, then the angler 
must choose some other variables such as time per day spent fishing (t), the number of 
fish landed (l), size of fish (s), which define the quality of a given fishing trip for each 
day.  
 However, unlike in Woodward and Griffin, the weakly separable assumption can 
not be applied in the TRs permit system because the angler must buy the TRs permits 
which are directly related to d and l, before he or she decides to go fishing. For example, 
if the rights are issued in fish, the angler should choose d and l, at the same time. 
Consequently, the framework used here drops the quality subfunction and assumes that 
an angler’s utility is affected directly by the variables d, l, s and t. 
 In addition, the angler faces the marginal cost per day, c, and has a fixed income 
of m that is spent in paying for trip expenditures and other goods. Woodward and Griffin 
(2003) pointed out due to a fixed cost per day, the model is directly applicable only to 
cases where the angler is considering one site, or cases in which all alternative sites are 
indistinguishable in terms of both cost and quality. 
 All variables are assumed to positively affect the angler’s utility and concavity 
condition for each decision variable is also assumed. Anderson (1993) pays attention to 
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the tradeoffs between l and d and Homans and Ruliffson (1999) concentrate on tradeoffs 
between l and s. We follow these tradeoff relationships for l-d and l-s.  In the absence of 
regulations, the representative angler’s decision problem is to choose d, t, l, s, and 0x  to 
maximize U subject to a budget constraint and a physical limit constraint that landings 
cannot exceed the number of fish harvested. The specification in the absence of 
regulations is as follows:  
( )
( )
0
0
max , , , ,  s.t.
; ,
U d l s t x
c d x m
l h t X
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where h is the catch per day, which is a function of the time spent fishing on that day, t, 
and the fish stock, X. 
From the first-order condition of the above equation with respect to 0x , it follows 
that at the optimum, 
0x
U  equals the shadow price on the budget constraint. Dividing U(⋅) 
by Ux, we obtain a money-metric function, ( ), , ,u d l s t , which indicates the total 
willingness to pay for d day trips (Woodward and Griffin, 2003). The angler’s 
optimization problem, therefore, can be as follows: 
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≤
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Again, 0x is the composite good and 0u  is its price which is usually set to one. 
The size constraint s≤f(l,h) indicates the feasible combinations of l and s given that the 
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angler has spent t hours in fishing and harvested h(t;X) fish. The function f will show 
opposite direction in l and h(.), meaning that if harvests or landings increase (decrease), 
size of fish will decrease (increase). An angler confronts the tradeoffs between the 
number of fish landed and the size of the catch (Woodward and Griffin 2003). 
Technology used in fishing such as nets and lines is not precisely included in the model 
but we assume that the trip cost (c) incorporates some of the fishing technology: 
expensive equipment will increase c. We also assume that c contains the opportunity 
cost of time, so that higher income people will have a greater cost.  
 Three alternatives can be considered for the measurement units of TR program as 
we introduce them in the previous chapter: i) rights in fish, fTR , ii) rights in days spent 
fishing, dTR , and iii) rights in pounds or weights, pTR . These TRs measurement units 
would provide different utility maximization solutions. 
 
Transferable Rights in Terms of Fish 
The rights could be stated in terms of the number of fish and a TRs holder of 
such a right would be allowed to harvest one fish (presumably of legal size) per permit. 
Fish-based TRs are consistent with existing regulations such as bag limits. However, if 
TRs are denominated in terms of numbers, there would be an incentive to discard 
smaller, less valuable fish. 
 If the unit of measurement for TRs is based on the number of fish, the quantity of 
TRs permits ( fTR ) purchased by each individual should be no less than the number of 
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days spent fishing d times the amount of fish landed l. We call this condition 
( fl d TR⋅ ≤ ) as the TRs limit constraint. In the budget constraint, the cost of purchasing 
TRs permits ( f fP TR⋅ ) should be added, where fP  is the price of a TRs permit. A 
representative angler’s problem is as follows: 
( )
( )
0 0
0
max , , ,  +   
s.t.   
;
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Define constraints as: 
( )
0   : Budget Constraint.
;                      : Landing Constriant.
( , )                      : Size Constraint.
                      : TRs Limit Constraint.
f f
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The fishing pattern which maximizes the angler’s utility given constraints can be 
determined by the above model. There are five decision variables in this model: the 
number of days spent fishing d, the number of fish landed l, the average size of the 
retained fish s, the time spent fishing t, and the amount of TRs permit purchased fTR .  If 
anglers are rational, all constraints should be binding except for the size 
constraint ( ),s f l h≤ , because anglers are likely to choose bigger size fish rather than 
more fish landed. However we check the Lagrangian of this model is as follows:  
0 0 0( , , , ) ( ) ( ( ; ))
( ( , )) ( ).
f f
f
L u d l s t u x P TR c d x m l h t x
s f l h d l TR
λ μ
φ δ
= + − ⋅ + ⋅ + − − −
− − − ⋅ −  
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From the first order condition with respect to 0x , it indicates that at the optimum 
0u equals the shadow price on the budget constraint λ . Without loss of generality, 
suppose the budget constraint is binding and the nonnegative 0u  equals 1. Hence we can 
drop out the shadow price of the budget constraintλ .   
( , , , ) ( ) ( ( ; )) ( ( , )) ( ).f f fL u d l s t P TR c d m l h t X s f l h d l TRμ φ δ= − ⋅ + ⋅ − − − − − − ⋅ −
 
The necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to the decision 
variables , , , ,d r l s t  are respectively as follows: 
 ( ) 0uL c l
d d
δ∂ ⋅∂ = − − ⋅ =∂ ∂  [3.1] 
 0f
f
L P
TR
δ∂ = − + =∂  [3.2] 
 ' 0l
L u d f
l l
μ δ φ∂ ∂= − − ⋅ + ⋅ =∂ ∂  [3.3] 
 0L u
s s
φ∂ ∂= − =∂ ∂  [3.4] 
 0.L u h f h
t t t h t
μ φ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + ⋅ + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  [3.5] 
Note that 'du d u∂ ∂ = , 'lu l u∂ ∂ = , 'su s u∂ ∂ = , and 'tu t u∂ ∂ = . 'hf h f∂ ∂ = , and 'th t h∂ ∂ = . 
From equation [3.2] which directly implies that δ should equal the permit price fP , if 
fP is not equal to zero, δ  should be nonnegative. That is, anglers will purchase 
additional TR permits until the willingness to pay for additional permit is equal to the 
trip cost. 
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 0.f
L d l TRδ
∂ = − ⋅ + =∂  [3.6] 
Using [3.1] and [3.2], the optimal number of fish landed can be readily found to be: 
 
'
* .d
f
u cl
P
−=  [3.7] 
From [3.3] and [3.2], the optimal number of days spent fishing becomes: 
 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
*
'
( ) ( ) .l l t l s l t s t
f t f
u f h u u f u u fd
P h P
μ φ− + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅= = ⋅  [3.8] 
After substituting [3.7] and [3.8] into [3.6] and arranging it, then the optimal number of 
TRs permits purchased for each angler becomes:  
 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
*
2 2'
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) .d l l d t l s l t s tf
f t f
u c u f u c h u u f u u fTR
P h P
μ φ− ⋅ − + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅= = ⋅  [3.9] 
Shadow prices could be eliminated using 'suφ = and ' ' ' '( )t s t tu u f hμ = − − ⋅  in 
[3.8] and [3.9]. If ' ' ' '( )t s t tu u f hμ = − − ⋅ is greater than zero, differentiating L with 
respect to μ  yields ( ; )l h t X= . The optimal solution for the time of spending fishing can 
be written: 
 * 1 *( ; ),t h l X−=   [3.10] 
where 1( )h− ⋅  is the inverse function of the harvesting function ( )h ⋅ . Because φ  is also 
nonnegative, the optimal size can be simply written by taking derivative L with respect 
toφ : 
 * * *( , ( ; )).s f l h t X=   [3.11] 
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The optima are dependent on marginal utilities of all the decision variables and 
derivatives of the harvest function and the size function. Because we do not know 
functional forms of utility, size and harvest functions, as an empirical matter, one will 
rarely be able to test relations of variables directly and find economic implications from 
the solutions. However, if our interest is in the direction of change, we can use 
comparative statics for the marginal changes of decision variables responding to the 
change in exogenous variables. 
Because price is an important role for market transactions under the TR program 
it is important to analyze the effect of change in the price on the decision variables such 
as l, d, and TR. Comparative statics of the change in TRs permit price is the following: 
 
'* *
2
( ) 0d
f ff
u cl l
P PP
−∂ = − = − <∂   [3.12] 
 
' '* *
2
( ) 0l l
f ff
u fd d
P PP
μ φ− + ⋅∂ = − = − <∂   [3.13] 
 
* * *2 0.f
f f
TR d l
P P
∂ ⋅ ⋅= − <∂   [3.14] 
 Because all numerators for above equations are positive, all derivatives with 
respective to the permit price should be negative. It implies that a policy of increasing 
the permit price leads to decrease the number of days fished, and the number of fish 
landed. The law of demand for the TRs permit is satisfied from [3.14], indicating that if 
the permit price goes up the number of permits an angler would purchase will decrease. 
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Conversely, a policy of reduction in the total number of TRs would increase the permit 
price. Differentiating *t with respect to p will yield 
 
* 1
0.
f f
t h l
P l P
−
+ −
∂ ∂ ∂= <∂ ∂ ∂   [3.15] 
Note that without loss of generality, the inverse harvest function is increasing in the 
number of fish landed ( 1 0h l−∂ ∂ > ). If the price goes up, anglers will spend less time 
fishing. Taking derivative of s with respect to Pf can be written 
 
*
0.
f f f
s f l f h t
P l P h t P
− − +− −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + >∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   [3.16] 
Note that 0f l∂ ∂ <  and 0f h∂ ∂ < , indicating that the size function f(·) is decreasing in 
the number of fish landed or harvested because of the tradeoff between s and l (or h(·)). 
It is also obvious that if harvest function h(·) is increasing in the time spent fishing then 
0h t∂ ∂ > .  Following equation [3.16], if the price of TRs which are stated in fish goes 
up, anglers are likely to catch bigger size fish.  
To sum up, if the price of the fish-based TRs increases, decision variables will show:  
• the number of TRs purchased will decrease, 
• the number of fish landed will decrease, 
• the time spent fishing will decrease, 
• the number of fishing trips will decrease, and 
• the size of fish caught will increase. 
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Transferable Rights in Terms of Days 
TRs could alternatively be stated in terms of the number of days for fishing as 
opposed to quantity-based rights. If stated as the number of days, bag limits would 
probably be used to control total catch. Relative to the other alternatives, a day-based 
permit is more easily monitored and enforced, but introduces more uncertainty in the 
number of fish caught and the size of caught fish. 
 If the unit of TRs is in days, the number of TR permit purchased by each 
individual, dTR , should be no less than the number of days spent fishing d ( dd TR≤ ). 
Other constraints are the same as the case of rights in fish above. A representative 
angler’s utility maximization problem if the unit of transferable rights is in days is as 
follows: 
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The Lagrangian of this model is as follows:  
( , , , ) ( ) ( ( ; )) ( ) ( ( , )).d d dL u d l s t P TR c d m l h t X d TR s f l hμ δ φ= − ⋅ + ⋅ − − − − − − −  
The necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to the decision variables 
, , , ,  and dd TR l s t  are as follows: 
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0
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δ∂ ⋅∂ = − − =∂ ∂     [3.17] 
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If the permit price is greater than zero, the marginal value of an extra TR permit, δ , 
should be nonnegative. This condition provides a fixed constraint of the number of days, 
d, as follows: 
 0.d
L d TRδ
∂ = − + =∂    [3.22] 
The number of permits purchased, dTR , equals the number of days d . In contrast 
to TRs in fish, we can not observe the optimal solutions of these decision variables. 
However, some comparative statics could be derived using second derivatives.   
After differentiating [3.17], 'd du c P− = , with respect to dP , and then 
dd P∂ ∂ could be derived as follows: 
 
2 2
2
12 2
21 .
d
d d d
d d
Pu d u l
d P d l P P
d u l u
P d l P d
−
∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
  [3.23] 
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If the cross-partial effect is relatively small, then, due to the concavity of utility function, 
the derivative of the number of days fishing with respect to the permit price is less than 
zero.  
 0 and 0.d
d d
TRd
P P
∂∂ < <∂ ∂   [3.24] 
As the permit price goes up, an angler will decrease the number of fishing trips. 
Because dTR d= , the condition will also say that the TR permit demand follows 
negatively sloped curve with respect to its price. The law of demand is confirmed under 
day-based TRs. 
After differentiating [3.19], ' ' 0l lu fμ φ− + ⋅ = , with respect to dP , and then 
dl P∂ ∂ could be derived as follows: 
 
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
1
2 2 2
2 2
?
?00 0
0
.
l
d d d d d
l
d d d d
l
d d d dA
A
u l u d f lf
l P l d P P P l P
u f l u d f
l l P l d P P P
l u d u ff
P l d P P P l l
μ φ φ
μ φφ
μ φ φ
−
+
−−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂+ − − − =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂− = − + +⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟= − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  [3.25] 
Assuming 
2
2
f
l
∂
∂  is small, the derivative of the number of fish landed with 
respect to the permit price will have a sign of  
2u
l d
∂− ∂ ∂ . If 
2u
l d
∂ ∂ ∂  is less than zero,11 
                                                 
11 It is hard to prove the sign of cross derivative 2u l d∂ ∂ ∂ but it may be very small and likely be 
less than zero. 
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then the comparative statics of l with respect to dP  is greater than zero ( 0dl P∂ ∂ > ). In 
this case, the number of fish landed will increase as the price of the day-based TRs 
increases. No matter how much fish anglers catch within the bag limit, they will pay the 
same amount of money under the day-based TR program. Anglers may catch more fish 
to get some compensation as the price increases. This is the reason the bag limit would 
probably be maintained when TRs are denominated by days. 
In equation [3.19] and [3.20], we can confirm that shadow prices could be 
nonnegative using 'suφ = and ' ' ' '( )t s t tu u f hμ = − − ⋅ . Differentiating L with respect to 
 and φ μ yields ( ; )l h t X=  and ( , ( ))s f l h= ⋅ , respectively. The time spent fishing, t, can 
simply be the inverse harvest function of l ( 1( ; )t h l X−= ). We can not obtain the optimal 
solutions of t and s, either. It does not mean that day-based permit is inferior to the other 
quantity-based rights because failing to derive the optimal solutions is a mathematical 
problem.   However, some comparative statics could be derived as follows: 
 
1
0
d d
t h l
P l P
−
+ +
∂ ∂ ∂= >∂ ∂ ∂   [3.26] 
 0.
d d d
s f l f h t
P l P h t P
− − ++ +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   [3.27] 
Note that if the number of fish landed is increasing in the permit price anglers 
will spend more time fishing. As shown in equation [3.27], if the price of TRs which are 
stated in day goes up, anglers are likely to catch smaller fish ( 0ds P∂ ∂ < ).  
To sum up, if the price of the day-based TRs increases:  
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• the number of TRs purchased will decrease, 
• the number of fish landed will increase, 
• the time spent fishing will increase, 
• the number of fishing trips will decrease, and 
• the size of caught fish will decrease. 
 
Transferable Rights in Terms of Pounds 
TRs could be stated in terms of the pounds. If stated as pounds, the total number 
of TRs permits should be set to be equal to the recreational sector’s portion of the TAC – 
e.g., 4.47 million lbs. The advantage of this approach is that it would be most directly 
comparable with the TAC and would reduce the incentive to discard undersize fish. 
 If the unit of TRs is in pounds, the amount of TR permit purchased pTR  should 
be no less than a coefficient of average pound ( )sα  times l d⋅  ( ps l d TRα ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤ ). For 
simplicity here we assume the relationship between the pounds and the size of fish is 
linear ( ( )s sα α= ⋅ ). Other constraints are the same as the other cases of fish-based and 
day-based TRs. A representative angler’s utility maximization problem if the unit of TRs 
is in pounds is as follows: 
( )
( )
0 0
0
max , , ,  +   
s.t.  
;
( , )
.
p p
p
u d l s t u x
P TR c d x m
l h t X
s f l h
s l d TRα
⋅ + ⋅ + ≤
≤
≤
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≤
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The Lagrangian of this model is as follows:  
( , , , ) ( ) ( ( ; )) ( ( , )) ( ).p ppL u d l s t P TR c d m l h t X s f l h s d l TRμ φ δ α= − ⋅ + ⋅ − − − − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −
 
The first order necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to the decision 
variables , , , ,  and pd TR l s t  are as follows: 
 0L u c s l
d d
δ α∂ ∂= − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =∂ ∂   [3.28]   
 0p
p
L P
TR
δ∂ = − + =∂     [3.29] 
 0L u fs d
l l l
μ δ α φ∂ ∂ ∂= − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + =∂ ∂ ∂   [3.30] 
 0L u d l
s s
δ α φ∂ ∂= − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − =∂ ∂   [3.31] 
 0.L u h f h
t t t h t
μ φ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + ⋅ + =∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂   [3.32] 
Unless the price becomes zero, the shadow price of the TR limit constraint δ should 
again be nonzero. Then  
 0.p
L s d l TRαδ
∂ = − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + =∂   [3.33] 
From [3.28] and [3.29], the amount of fish landed becomes: 
 
'
.d
d
u cl
P sα
−= ⋅ ⋅   [3.34] 
Arranging [3.29] and [3.30] yield the number of days spent fishing: 
 
' '
.l l
d
u fd
P s
μ φ
α
− + ⋅= ⋅ ⋅   [3.35] 
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After substituting equation [3.34] and [3.35] into [3.31] and rearranging, the optimal size 
can be measured: 
' ' '
'd l l
d s
d d
u c u fP u
P s P s
μ φα φα α
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− − + ⋅⋅ ⋅ = −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
' ' '
2
'
( ) ( )
( )
d l l
p s
u c u fs
P u
μ φ
α φ
− ⋅ − + ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ −  
 
' ' '
*
'
( ) ( ) .
( )
d l l
p s
u c u fs
P u
μ φ
α φ
− ⋅ − + ⋅= ⋅ ⋅ −   [3.36] 
Substituting equation [3.36] into [3.34] and [3.35], the optimal l and d are obtained:  
 
' '
*
' '
( ) ( )
( )
d s
p l l
u c ul
P u f
φ
α μ φ
− ⋅ −= ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅   [3.37] 
 
' ' '
*
'
( ) ( ) .
( )
l l s
p d
u f ud
P u c
μ φ φ
α
− + ⋅ ⋅ −= ⋅ ⋅ −   [3.38] 
Substituting equation [3.36], [3.37] and [3.38] into [3.33], we can get the optimal 
number of TRs purchased. 
 
' ' ' '
*
3
( ) ( ) ( )d l l s
p
p
u c u f uTR
P
μ φ φ
α
− ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ −= ⋅   [3.39] 
The effects of the change in TRs permit price on the decision variables are as follow: 
 3
2
' ' '*
'
( ) ( )
0
2 ( )
d l l
p p s
u c u fs
P P u
μ φ
α φ
− ⋅ − + ⋅∂ = − <∂ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −   [3.40] 
 3
2
' '*
' '
( ) ( )
0
2 ( )
d s
p p l l
u c ul
P P u f
φ
α μ φ
− ⋅ −∂ = − <∂ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅   [3.41] 
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 3
2
' ' '*
'
( ) ( )
0
2 ( )
l l s
p p d
u f ud
P P u c
μ φ φ
α
− + ⋅ ⋅ −∂ = − <∂ ⋅ ⋅ −   [3.42] 
 5
2
* ' ' ' '2 ( ) ( ) ( )
0.
3
p d l l s
p p
TR u c u f u
P P
μ φ φ
α
∂ − ⋅ − + ⋅ ⋅ −= − <∂ ⋅ ⋅   [3.43] 
 Because all numerators and denominators for above equations are positive, all 
derivatives with respective to the permit price should be negative. It implies that if the 
permit price issued in pounds increases, decision variables such as s, d, l would decrease.  
The law of demand for the TRs permit is also satisfied from [3.43], indicating that if the 
permit price goes up, the number of permits an angler would purchase will decrease. 
Because the shadow prices of the landing constraint μ  could be nonzero, 
differentiating L with respect toμ yields ( ; )l h t X= . The optimal solution for the time 
spent fishing t can be the inverse harvest function of l ( * 1 *( ; )t h l X−= ). Taking 
derivative of *t  with respect pP  will be expressed: 
  
* 1
0.
p p
t h l
P l P
−
+ −
∂ ∂ ∂= <∂ ∂ ∂   [3.44] 
The time an angler spends in fishing will increase as the price goes up.  
To sum up, if the price of the pound-based TRs increases:  
• the number of TRs purchased will decrease, 
• the number of fish landed will decrease, 
• the time spent fishing will decrease, 
• the number of fishing trips will decrease, and 
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• the size of fish caught will decrease. 
 
Comparison between Unit Alternatives  
In the analysis of previous section the angler seeks to maximize his or her utility 
subject to some constraints including the TRs limit constraint. In order to address which 
TRs unit of measurement is preferred, we use the tradeoffs between d and l which appear 
in the TRs limit constraints. 
 
Area I 
l·d>l * 
TR f  -Binds 
TR d -Not Binds 
Area II 
l·d<l * 
TR f  -Not binds 
TR d -Not binds 
Area IV 
l·d>l *
f -Binds 
TR d-Binds 
Area III 
l·d<l *
-Not binds 
TR d-Binds 
l·d=TRf   =l 
* 
TR d
d 
l 
TR 
TR f 
 
FIGURE 3.1 
Comparison between Day and Fish Based TRs 
 
Figure 3.1 shows l-d space of two TRs limit constraints between TRs in fish and 
days. For given ( )h t , an angler will choose a point in this space. Negatively sloped line 
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with asymptotic tails fl d TR⋅ =  indicates the TRs limit constraint in fish and is assumed 
to equal a certain level of the number of fish landed *l . The vertical line dd TR=  
indicates the TRs limit constraint in days. 
These constraints between l and d segment four areas. Area 1 implies the region 
of l-d combination where the TRs limit constraint in days does not bind ( dd TR< ) but 
the TRs limit constraint in fish binds ( fl d TR⋅ = ). Area 2 indicates the region where 
both constraints do not bind ( dd TR< and fl d TR⋅ < ). Area 3 reflects the region where 
the TRs constraint in fish does not bind ( fl d TR⋅ < ) but the TRs limit constraint in days 
binds ( dd TR= ).Finally, area 4 presents the region where both TRs limit constraints bind 
( dd TR= and fl d TR⋅ = ). 
 The optimal solutions of l and d on area 2 and 4 might not tell which unit of TRs 
permit would be preferred. If area 1 and 3 are chosen, the preferred unit of measurement 
for TRs will be controversial. If the optimal solution of the number of days spent fishing 
and the amount of fish landed is located on area 1, the TRs permit in fish will be 
preferred. On the other hand, if the optimal solution is determined on area 3, the day-
based TRs permit will be preferred to the fish-based TRs.  
If TRs are stated as the number of days, bag limits would be used to control total 
catches. Figure 3.2 shows TRs limit constraints and bag limit on l-d space. If the bag 
limit which is classified by the horizontal line bl   is implemented for TRs in days, areas 
above bl  such as area 1, 4 and the shaded area 5 can not be chosen. In this case, an 
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angler’s choice combination between d and l is highly restricted in area 3 and anglers are 
likely to prefer the day-based permit to fish-based permit. 
 
FIGURE 3.2 
Comparison between Day and Fish Based TRs in the Presence of Bag Limits 
 
Comparison between TRs Units Using Specified Functional Forms  
We can explore the relative advantages of the different units of measurement for 
TRs in more detail by making assumptions about the functional form of the angler’s 
utility function. Assuming a quadratic utility function in each decision variable, a 
representative angler’s utility function is as follows: 
Area I
Area II
Area IV
Area III
l·d=TR f =l *
TRd
d 
l 
lb
Area V 
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2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
d d d l l l s s s t t t
d d l l s s t t
u d d l l s s t t
d d l l s s t t
γ α β γ α β γ α β γ α β
γ α β α β α β α β
= + + + + + + + + + + +
= + + + + + + + +  
where .d l s tγ γ γ γ γ= + + +  
 The β s are negative and the α s are positive, which implies that the utility 
function is weakly concave in the variables. In addition, the harvest function ( ; )h t X  and 
the size function ( , )f l h  are assumed as follows: 
( ; ) ,h t X k t= ⋅  
( , ) (1 ) ,l lf l h s s
h h
= − + ⋅   
where k is the catch rate per time (e.g., one fish an hour), s is the highest size and s  
indicates the lowest size an angler can catch. The assumption that the landing constraint 
is binding, meaning that  l h k t= = ⋅  and s s= , is imposed because of difficulty to solve 
inequality constraints. If the quantity of fish landed equals the quantity of fish harvested, 
an angler should catch the lowest size fish because there is a negative relationship 
between size and the amount of fish landed. If this strong assumption is imposed, the 
inequality constraints are replaced by equality constraints. 
 We stress the comparison between unit of TRs in fish and unit of TRs in days 
because the unit in pounds is just TRs in fish times the average pound per fish which is a 
function of size. 
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Unit in Fish 
The utility maximization problem using the quadratic utility function is now as 
follows. 
2 2 2 2max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
s.t.         
            
            
            .
d d l l s s t t
f f
f
u d d l l s s t t
P TR c d m
l k t
l d TR
s s
γ α β α β α β α β= + + + + + + + +
⋅ + ⋅ =
= ⋅
⋅ =
=
 
The Lagrangian we would solve if the unit is stated in fish is as follows: 
2 2 2 2( ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )
( ( ) ).
d d l l s s t t
f
L d d k t k t s s t t
P d k t c d m
γ α β α β α β α β= + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + + + +
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ −  
Decision variables are , , , , and fd l s t TR , and parameters are  and cfP . New 
coefficients of the specified functions include ( , , , )d l s tα α α α and ( , , , )d l s tβ β β β for the 
utility function and k  for the harvest function. The signs of α s are positive and the 
signs of β s are negative for concavity of the quadratic utility function. All other 
parameters , , , ,  and fP k c m s  are positive. 
 The first order necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to the 
decision variables  and d t  are as follows: 
 2 0d d f
L d P k t c
d
α β∂ = + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − =∂     [3.45] 
 22 2 0l l t t f
L k k t t P d k
t
α β α β∂ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ =∂   [3.46] 
 .
2
d f
d
c P k t
d
α
β
− + ⋅ ⋅=   [3.47] 
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Substitute [3.47] into [3.46], and arrange it.  
22 2 ( ) 0
2
d f
l t l t f
d
c P k t
k k t t P k
αα α β β β
− + ⋅ ⋅⋅ + + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ =
2 2 22 ( ) 2 (2 2 ) ( ) 0d l t d l t f d fk k t P k c P k tβ α α β β β α⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ =  
2 2 2(2 (2 2 ) ) ( ) 2 ( ).d l t f f d d l tk P k t P k c kβ β β α β α α⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ − − ⋅ +  
The optimal t under fish-based TRs is written 
 * 2 2 2
( ) 2 ( )
.
2 (2 2 )
f d d l t
f
d l t f
P k c k
t
k P k
α β α α
β β β
⋅ − − ⋅ += ⋅ + − ⋅   [3.48] 
The subscript f indicates the fish permits. Similarly, the optimum d becomes: 
2 2 2
( ) 2 ( )1 ( )
2 2 (2 2 )
f d d l t
d f
d d l t f
P k c k
d c P k
k P k
α β α ααβ β β β
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⋅ − − ⋅ +⎪ ⎪= − + ⋅ ⋅⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⋅ + − ⋅⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
 
{ } { }2 2 2
2 2 2
( ) 2 (2 2 ) ( ) 2 ( )1
2 2 (2 2 )
d d l t f f f d d l t
d d l t f
c k p k P k P k c k
k P k
d
α β β β α β α α
β β β β
− ⋅ + − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − − ⋅ += ⋅ + − ⋅
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
1
2
d
d
β
=
( ) 2
d d
c α β− ⋅ 2 2 2(2 2 ) ( )
l t d f
k c P kβ β α⋅ + − − ⋅ ⋅ 2 2 ( )
f d
P k c α+ ⋅ − 2
f d
P k β− ⋅ ⋅
2 2 2
( )
2 (2 2 )
l t
d l t f
k
k P k
α α
β β β
⋅ +
⋅ + − ⋅
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
 
2
*
2 2 2
( )(2 2 ) ( )
.
2 (2 2 )
d l t f l t
f
d l t f
c k P k k
d
k P k
α β β α α
β β β
− ⋅ + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ += ⋅ + − ⋅   [3.49] 
The optimal fl  is as follows in [3.50]: 
 
2
*
2 2 2
( ) 2 ( )
.
2 (2 2 )
f d d l t
f
d l t f
P k c k k
l
k P k
α β α α
β β β
⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ += ⋅ + − ⋅   [3.50] 
Now, we get the optimal solutions for fish-based TRs. These solutions will be 
used for comparison with day-based TRs. 
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Unit in Days 
The utility maximization problem using the quadratic utility function is now as 
follows: 
2 2 2 2max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
s.t.  
     
     
     .
d d l l s s t t
d d
d
u d d l l s s t t
P TR c d m
l k t
d TR
s s
γ α β α β α β α β= + + + + + + + +
⋅ + ⋅ =
= ⋅
=
=
 
The Lagrangian we would solve is as follows: 
2 2 2 2( ) ( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )
( ).
d d l l s s t t
d
L d d k t k t s s t t
P d c d m
γ α β α β α β α β= + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + + + +
− ⋅ + ⋅ −  
The first order necessary conditions for an interior solution with respect to the 
decision variables ,d t  are as follows: 
 2 0d d d
L d P c
d
α β∂ = + ⋅ − − =∂    [3.51]  
 22 2 0.l l t t
L k k t t
t
α β α β∂ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + + ⋅ =∂   [3.52] 
From equation [3.51], the optimal d becomes: 
 * ( ) .
2
d d
d
d
c Pd αβ
− +=   [3.53] 
Using equation [3.52], the optimal t can be written: 
 * 2
( ) .
2 2
l t
d
l t
kt
k
α α
β β
− ⋅ += ⋅ +   [3.54] 
The subscript d indicates the day-based permits. Finally, the optimal l under the 
day-based TRs becomes:  
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 * 2
( ) .
2 2
l t
d
l t
k kl
k
α α
β β
− ⋅ += ⋅ +   [3.55] 
Using these optimal solutions of decision variables for fish-based and day-based 
TRs, now we can analyze which unit of measurement for TRs is preferable. 
 
Comparison between Two Unit Alternatives 
Let the symbols dD , lD , and tD be the differences of optimal  d, l, and t between 
unit  alternatives. The signs of differences between * *and f dl l , and between 
* * and f dt t  are 
demonstrated in [3.56] and [3.57]. Positive sign indicates the optimal level of the 
number of fish for the fish-based TRs are greater than that for day-based TRs and vice 
verse (see Appendix 1 for specific calculation). Using the assumptions stated above, we 
find  
 * * 0l f dD l l= − < , and  [3.56] 
 * * 0t f dD t t= − < .  [3.57] 
Because lD  is negative, TRs denominated in days provide more fish landed than 
do TRs denominated in fish. Similarly, TRs denominated in days allow anglers to spend 
more time than do TRs denominated in fish. The sign of difference between * *and df dd  
is shown at [3.58]. Positive sign indicates the optimal solution of fishing days for fish-
based TRs is greater than that for day-based TRs, and vice verse. 
 * * 0d f dD d d= − > .  [3.58] 
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Fish-based TRs provide anglers with more days spent fishing than do day-based 
TRs. After substituting all decision variables into the utility function, we can compare 
which unit of measurement is preferred in terms of utility (see appendix 1). 
 0 or 0U f dD u u= − < > .  [3.59] 
We can not assure which unit alternative gives greater utility to an angler. If 
anglers put more weight on the number of fish landed or fishing time when they evaluate 
their utilities of fishing, the utility under day-based TRs will be greater than that under 
fish-based TRs ( f du u< ). On the other hand, if they want more days for fishing, fish-
base TRs will be preferred to the day-based TRs. 
The results using defined signs of coefficients indicate that a day-based permit 
provides more fish landed and more fishing time than does a fish-based permit. On the 
other hand, fish-based permit allows anglers to spend more days in fishing than does the 
day-based permit. It is ambiguous which unit of measurement for TRs provides 
fishermen with bigger utility. 
Fish-based permit for the recreational TRs supplies some advantages. First, it 
gives more fishing days to anglers. Under current fishing regulations, open days for 
fishing are strictly limited so that anglers can not go fishing as much as they want to fish.  
TR program under fish-based permit will increase their fishing days and they may go 
fishing as much as or whenever they want. Anglers who have a small number of permits 
can utilize all remaining permits at once on the last day that their permits are valid.  
 A day-based permit has also some advantages. First, it can be more easily 
monitored and enforced. Fishing authorities will be able to easily confirm and check 
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how many permits anglers use when they leave or come back so that rights constraint 
which states that the number of permits they use should not exceed the number of rights 
permits they purchase can be satisfied. Second, anglers can catch and land more fish per 
trip. If they place more weights on the number of fish landed in their utility, the day-
based permit may be preferred.  
 
 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter provides a theoretical model to investigate the effects of the change 
in the TR permit price on the key decision variables such as the number of fish landed, 
the number of days taking fishing trips, the size of caught fish, and the time spent 
fishing. We set up different models by the unit of measurement such as fish-based, day-
based, and pound-based TRs. The law of demand is satisfied for TR program no matter 
what unit of measurement is used. 
In addition, we analyze which unit of measurement is preferable between fish-
based and day-based TRs. Under the assumptions made here, some of which are quite 
strong, the fish-based permit allows anglers to spend more days fishing and the day-
based permit gives greater fish landed and fishing time. An angler’s preference between 
fish-based and day-based permits in terms of utility depends on coefficients’ magnitudes 
in his or her utility function.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ON THE USE OF DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL FOR 
RECREATION DEMAND ANALYSIS 
 
 
The objective of this chapter is to empirically estimate recreation demand that 
incorporates TR permit demand. Because the model uses travel cost as an approximate 
variable of the price, it is often called Travel Cost model (TCM). We expect that when 
TR program is implemented the price (cost) of fishing will increase because anglers are 
required to buy TR permits additionally to go fishing. Our focus is on estimating an 
effect of price changes on the fishing trip demand.  
Suppose the price of taking a fishing trip increases simply by paying a daily 
access fee. A daily fee will be directly compatible with day-based TRs discussed in the 
previous two chapters. The difference is that a fee is fixed by the government, but the 
price of day-based TRs can vary by market demand. In this chapter we examine a daily 
access fee policy as an approximate price instrument of TR program. We find that a fee 
can be very effective in reducing recreational fishing demand in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Income is an important determinant of an individual’s choice to travel to go fishing and, 
if an individual chooses to fish, which fishing mode is chosen. 
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Background 
A price instrument such as fees and TR programs might be a way to reduce 
recreational effort that would avoid the inefficiencies that arise because of season 
closures. In particular, relative to alternative ways to control congestion or over-use, fees 
have the advantage of leading to a more economically efficient outcome because they 
make it possible for those that value the resource most highly to use it. However, of most 
relevance here, fees are criticized on the grounds of equity since they tend to exclude the 
poorest user groups from use of resources (More and Stevens 2000). Any 
implementation of fees (increase in price) in recreation management inevitably raises the 
issue of equity although fees are touted for the numerous advantages in terms of 
economic efficiency. Important questions to policy makers are: Is it unfair to low income 
people to charge substantial fishing fees? Do recreational fees disproportionately impact 
anglers who engage in the least expensive mode of fishing?  Should we worry if 
secondary impacts on merchants and service providers are distributed inequitably?   
Economic analysis of recreational behavior should provide results that capture 
distributional consequences so that these questions might be answered. Revealed 
preference models of recreation demand are often estimated using discrete choice 
approaches falling into the class of random utility models, and unfortunately, within 
these, the marginal utility of income is typically assumed to be constant [e.g., Caulkins 
et al.(1986) and Bockstael et al.(1987)].  In contrast, in our model below, the sensitivity 
to price varies across fishing modes (access by charter boat, private boat, from shore) 
and income, allowing estimation of the distributional impacts that a fee might have 
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across user groups. The estimated recreational demand is mode-specific to analyze 
which mode users are more affected by price changes. 
 
Literature Review 
To begin, we first briefly consider the random utility model (RUM) and the role 
that income plays in such models. Second we review some literature on imposing fees in 
the recreational setting. The use of the RUM in recreation demand or travel cost models 
is now quite well documented in the literature. We cannot provide an extensive review 
of such literature here, and that has been done in numerous other papers (see for 
example, the introductory chapter in Hanley et al. and references therein). The RUM has 
a few distinct advantages over some other types of models (specifically the single-site 
count data approach) in that it handles substitution among sites rather well. However, in 
virtually all existing recreation demand models that have been estimated using the 
RUM-based approach, income effects are assumed to be absent. We are aware of very 
few estimated RUM models that appear in published or unpublished papers that allow 
for a non-constant marginal utility of income.12 Doing so generally leads to some very 
difficult technical issues (for discussion see Herriges and Kling 1999; McFadden 1999; 
Shaw and Ozog 1999).  
                                                 
12 Shonkwiler and Shaw (2003) consider the impact of a $5 increase in the fee at one of the 
Columbia River main-stem reservoirs within a finite mixture model that allows for income 
effects, but this is quite different than the usual RUM model. They find that recreational users in 
one regime experience almost twice the loss in consumer’s surplus as those in another income 
regime. 
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Distributional consequences of environmental or resource programs have been 
considered in a variety of settings, including tradable pollution permits, the share of 
water shortages, and in situations where “grandfathering” allocation schemes are 
allowed (see Ruström and Williams 2005). The distributional impacts of recreation fees, 
in the context of well-developed recreation demand models, have not been frequently 
addressed in the mainstream literature on travel cost modeling. One notable exception is 
the contingent valuation study by Adams et al. (1989): their study of hunting and fees 
illustrates that lower income groups have higher losses than higher income hunters when 
a flat “per-head’ fee is imposed. 
Several authors of leisure studies (Reiling et al., 1996; Bowker et. Al, 1999; 
More and Stevens, 2000) have concluded that implementation of a fee or an increase in a 
fee would lower recreational participation by low-income people. More and Stevens 
(2000) found that a $5 daily fee to access public lands would affect almost half of the 
low-income people as compared to a smaller portion (33%) of high-income people. 
Reiling et al. (1996) estimated that recreational demand for public lands on the part of 
low-income groups is more elastic than that of middle or high income groups, which 
implies that low income people would be more responsive to a price increase. These 
studies support the notion that income inequity is problematic in recreational activities. 
In contrast to these studies, Kyle et al. (2002) find no significant correlation between 
household income and willingness to pay for fees, and Winter et al. (1999) found that 
income was less helpful in understanding public response to fees than a measure of 
social trust. 
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Our econometric model below draws on recent work by Morey et al. (2003a and 
2003b) that incorporates income effects in a simple fashion. Morey and his colleagues 
assume that utility is “a piece-wise linear spline function” of expenditures. In this case, 
the change in the marginal utility of money is assumed to be a step function of money 
income. This piece-wise spline approach is used to deal with income effect below. The 
approach is well suited for our income data set, which is available categorically. We use 
this approach within the context of a repeated discrete choice random utility model. 
 
 Model 
To estimate recreational demand, one would ideally like to know the destination, 
the frequency, and what mode is chosen for each trip. Such data is rarely available, for 
the simple reasons that collecting it is complicated, there are limits to respondent recall, 
and such data are cost-prohibitive. Hence, it is often the case that data are gathered as in 
the MRFSS data used in this study, with rather complete information about a single 
intercept trip and less complete data for other trips that the individual may have taken.  
Although the data are not as complete as the analyst might desire, the partial data on the 
non-intercept trips do offer potentially valuable insights into angler preferences and their 
demand for fishing trips. Morey, Shaw, and Rowe (hereafter MRS-1991) developed a 
statistical and theoretical model that takes advantage of data of this type, and we follow 
very closely the discrete choice-random utility model they developed.  
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Random Utility Model of Fishing Participation and Mode Choice 
 In the MSR model, the assumption was made that anglers engage in a pattern 
corresponding to a repeated decision, leading to a “repeated” discrete choice or random 
utility model of recreation demand. The repeated choice model framework is adopted by 
Morey et al. (1993), and Shaw and Ozog (1999), and a host of others. Issues and 
extensive discussion can be found in Morey (1999) and Parsons et al. (1999). Using this 
model in our context, an angler confronts two simultaneous decisions: whether to go 
recreational fishing at all, and if the angler does so, the mode that will be used, i.e. 
whether to fish from shore, from a private boat, from a rental boat, or from a charter 
boat. Kim, Shaw, and Woodward (forthcoming) estimate a model with county specific 
destinations. Here our emphasis is on tradeoffs across modes, so we treat the Gulf of 
Mexico as a uniform destination, but the distance that an angler has to travel to reach the 
Gulf varies widely.  
 The econometric model essentially reduces to estimating two conditional 
probabilities.  First, an angler i has a daily probability of not going fishing equal to nfiπ . 
In the given fishing period, X, she takes iQ trips, not including the trip where we observe 
the angler’s destination. Over the X days in a period there are ( )( )! ! !X Q X Q⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  
combinations of Q days so that the probability of observing Qi trips becomes 
 ( )1
!( ) ( ) (1 )
!( )!
i iX Q Qnf nf
i i i
i i
Xf Q
Q X Q
π π−⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ . [4.1] 
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 Second, we estimate the probability, fmiπ , that an angler i chooses mode m for her 
intercept trip.  Defining mtiy =1 if an angler i took mode m on the trip where we observe 
the angler’s mode in period t and mtiy =0 otherwise, the marginal distribution of choosing 
mode m can be concisely written  
 2
1
( ) ( ) sti
M
yf
mti si
s
f y π
=
=∏ . [4.2] 
 Finally, following MSR (1991), we combine these two conditional probabilities 
to form the likelihood function. Given a random sample of N independent participants 
and assuming that iQ  and mtiy  are independently distributed, the probability of 
observing the participation and mode choices for the anglers in the sample is  
 1 2
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( ),
N N
i mti i mti
i i
L f Q y f Q f y
= =
= =∏ ∏  [4.3] 
where ( , )i mtif Q y is the joint distribution.  
The use of the probability in equation [4.3] in the likelihood function would 
suffer from intercept bias since those that fish more often are more likely to be 
interviewed.  Hence, in the likelihood function estimated, we introduce a correction for 
potential intercept bias, replacing the distribution of unobserved trips with a sampling 
distribution that assumes being in the sample is proportional to the total number of trips 
one takes.13 With this assumption, the modified likelihood function becomes: 
                                                 
13 See the intercept bias correction discussed in MSR (1991), their equation 14, and the relevant 
text where results are discussed. 
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  In order to estimate the probabilities of making the mode and participation 
choices, a functional form for the indirect utility function must be specified.  Applying 
the typical linear specification of a RUM model to the problem of mode choice, the 
utility of an angler in period t is a function of the angler’s fishing budget in period t, Bti, 
and whether or not a particular mode m has been chosen at a personal cost of Pmi. In 
addition to the price and budget, catch rate ( mCR ) will affect utility when the angler 
takes a trip. That is, we write ( )0 0ti tiU Bα β= +  if the angler does not fish, and 
( )mti m m ti mi mtiU CR B Pα γ β ε= + ⋅ + − +  if the angler chooses mode m, where εmti is the 
error terms capturing unexplained variation in the utility when the angler chooses to fish. 
The coefficients α0 and αj can be functions of variables describing the angler, the mode, 
or the season.   
 An angler will not fish if the reservation utility, U0ti, is greater than the utility 
enjoyed in all of the modes.  Hence the probability that an angler does not fish, nfiπ , is 
the probability that U0ti>Umti for all other modes, so 
nf
iπ  is a decreasing function of the 
difference Umti−U0ti.  This difference can be simplified to  
 ( )0 0mti ti m m mi mtiU U CR Pα α γ β ε− = − + ⋅ − + . [4.5] 
As in MSR (1991) it is assumed that the non-fishing utility is deterministic so 
that the error in this equation is captured in the single error term, εmti.  There is a straight 
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forward interpretation of equation [4.5]. The difference between the α’s in the 
parentheses can be thought of as the utility gain achieved by fishing using mode m.  The 
miPβ−  term reflects the cost in terms of decreased utility that the angler must pay in 
order to gain the benefits of the fishing trip. The usual assumption in the applied 
literature is that the marginal utility of income is constant so that β is the same for all 
possible uses of income or income levels.  This specification implies, therefore, that if an 
angler’s fishing costs increase by one dollar, his or her utility declines by a fixed amount 
that does not vary across incomes or for any other reason. We believe that it is intuitively 
plausible that β’s may actually vary across both modes and incomes.  For example, the 
angler’s response to a one dollar increase in the cost of a charter fishing trip, with an 
average cost of over $250, may be quite different from his or her response to a one dollar 
increase in the cost of a $30 shore fishing trip.  If the marginal effect of a price change 
varies across modes, then we would rewrite [4.5] as 
 ( )0 0mti ti m m m mi mtiU U CR Pα α γ β ε− = − + ⋅ − + , [4.6] 
allowing for a separate coefficient βm for each of the m categories. Regardless of 
whether [4.5]] or [4.6] is used, only the coefficient on the price is identified; the 
coefficient on income can only be identified to the extent that it is assumed to be equal to 
the coefficients on the prices.   
 The specification suggested by [4.5] is a restricted form of [4.6], a theoretical 
restriction that can be tested empirically.  In our empirical application, we allow the β 
parameters to vary across modes, after testing and rejecting this restriction.  Rejection of 
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this hypothesis does not necessarily mean that consumers are violating a fundamental 
principle of consumer behavior, but it does suggest that anglers’ demand behavior is 
more complicated than is typically assumed.    
 In equation [4.6], it is assumed that the marginal utility of money varies 
depending on the type of mode being chosen. Alternatively or in addition, it might be 
that the β parameters vary across income groups. To allow for this type of variation, we 
adopt Morey et al.’s (2003a, 2003b) linear spline function approach in which the 
marginal utility of income varies for different income brackets. If this approach is 
adopted, then an angler’s utility (temporarily suppressing the coefficient on and the catch 
rate variable) taking a trip in mode m would be written  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
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 [4.7] 
where M0 and M1 are threshold points where it is assumed that the marginal utility of 
income changes.  If this approach is used, then the utility difference equation, [4.5], 
would be rewritten 
 ( )0 0mti ti m m j mi mtiU U CR Pα α γ β ε− = − + ⋅ − +  [4.8] 
where j=0,1,2 for the three different income categories.  Again, the specification in [4.5] 
is a testable restriction of [4.8].   
 Finally, equation [4.9] is the most flexible specification, in which the slope 
coefficients vary across both income and mode.  In this case, [4.5] would be written 
 ( )0 0mti ti m m jm mi mtiU U CR Pα α γ β ε− = − + ⋅ − +  [4.9] 
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where the marginal utility of money, βjm, is allowed to vary for each combination of 
mode and income.   
Regardless of the utility specification chosen, as shown in Morey (1999) if we 
assume that in each period the angler’s vector is randomly drawn from a Type I Extreme 
Value distribution then the joint CDF of this distribution is  
 
1
( ) exp exp( ) .
M
ti mti
m
Fε ε ε
=
⎡ ⎤= − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑   [4.10] 
Letting V0ti and Vmti indicate the deterministic part of the angler’s utility (i.e. without ε0ti 
and εmti, respectively), we obtain the specifications that are actually used in estimation as 
in Morey et al. (1991). The probability of not fishing becomes 
 [ ]0 0
1
Prob [ , ] exp exp ( ) .
M
nf
i ti mti ti mti
m
U U m V Vπ
=
⎧ ⎫= > ∀ = − − −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑   [4.11] 
Once the decision to go fishing has been made, the probability of choosing mode m over 
the other modes can be written  
 [ ]
1
Prob [ , ] 1 exp ( )
M
f
mi mti sti mti sti
s
U U s V Vπ
=
= > ∀ = − −∑ .  [4.12] 
After selecting the model to be estimated, [4.5], [4.6], [4.8], or [4.9], equations  [4.11] 
and  [4.12] are used in the likelihood function to find the parameters of each model. 
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Data, Estimation, and Empirical Results 
Data 
 The data used here come from the 1997 Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics 
Survey (MRFSS). The history of the MRFSS data set is discussed in Hicks et al. (1999) 
and the data used here are from the 1997 study (discussed in detail in Whitehead and 
Haab, 1999), using the economic add-on to the standard intercept data. The approach to 
collecting the data is commonly used by the National Marine Fisheries Service and the 
data here are almost identical in nature to the data originally encountered by MSR 
(1991). In these data, there is complete information only about the intercept trip, and 
partial information about other trips that the angler takes in a two-month period.  Anglers 
in 1997 MRFSS intercept survey were contacted at a variety of locations including 
docks, marinas, and other sites along the Gulf Coasts (except Texas coast). The follow-
up economic survey was conducted over the telephone. The data are divided into six 
waves of two months each. 
The questions in the survey include those about general characteristics of 
respondents, their number of fishing days within last two months, specific information of 
intercept trips, i.e., what mode of fishing they engaged in, when they went fishing, and 
what they targeted and caught. Here we focus on single-day trips at four states along the 
Gulf of Mexico coast. The sampling was stratified by mode (table 4.1). Anglers that 
were interviewed fished an average of 7.11 days during the two month fishing period 
and they have an average of 18.1 years of fishing experience. 
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The most common mode of fishing for anglers in our sample was using a private 
boat (73%), which is not surprising since about 63% of anglers own a boat. The other 
modes are by charter boat (4.1%), with the remainder fishing from the shore (22.9%). 
Interviews were spread unevenly throughout the year with a greater proportion conduced 
in the Sep-Oct and May-Jun waves (19.8%) and the fewest in the coldest and hottest 
months, Jan-Feb and Jul-Aug (12.8% and 14.2%, respectively). 
 
TABLE 4.1 
 Distributions and Variable Summary Statistics  
Frequency Percentage 
Mode Distribution   
Charter 153 4.1% 
Private 2696 73.0% 
Shore 845 22.9% 
Fishing Period Distribution  
Jan-Feb  (Dwave1)  474 12.8% 
Mar-Apr  (Dwave2) 579 15.7% 
May-Jun  (Dwave3) 733 19.8% 
Jul-Aug (Dwave4) 525 14.2% 
Sep-Oct (Dwave5) 733 19.8% 
Nov-Dec 650 17.6% 
Income Distribution   
less than $35,000 (DM0) 1768 47.9% 
$35,001 to $75,000 (DM1) 1559 42.2% 
Greater than $75,001 (DM2) 367 9.9% 
Other Dummy   
Own a boat (Dboat) 2314 62.6% 
Target red snapper (Dredsn) 42 1.1% 
Mean Std. Dev 
Trips 7.11   8.47 
Experience (Exper) 18.06 14.16 
Note: Variable names in parentheses where appropriate. 
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The survey questionnaire identified income in 11 categories, which we aggregate 
into three broad categories: low (less than $35,000), middle ($35,001 to $75,000), and 
high (greater than $75,001). These income levels correspond roughly to the 50% and 
80% thresholds for U.S. households reported in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey.14 Because 34% of respondents in the sample do not reveal their 
income, the log linear ordinary least squares regression model suggested and estimated 
by Haab et al. (2000) is used to impute missing income values. After using imputed 
income, those in the low income category constitute 47.9% of the total sample. The 
middle income category contains 42.2% of the respondents, and the rest of the sample 
(9.9%) falls into the high income category. 
Travel costs to the three modes for 38 destinations near the angler’s home (the 
intercept destinations) are constructed using distances calculated using the Zipfip 
program. In addition, the opportunity cost of an angler’s time in travel to and from the 
site is factored in using assumed travel speeds and reported wage rates as the opportunity 
cost of time per hour, if these are available in the anglers’ responses. For anglers not 
reporting wage rates but reporting annual income we used average hourly income 
instead, and for those reporting neither wage nor income, we used a hedonic regression 
to predict their wage rate per hour (see Appendix 2). Retirees are assumed to have an 
opportunity cost of time equal to the minimum wage rate. Because we construct only a 
mode choice model, the travel costs and opportunity costs of time to get to the intercept 
                                                 
14 In 1997, 50% of the U.S. households had an income less than $40,699, 80% less than $78,638 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/histinc/ie4.html). 
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destinations do not vary across modes but vary widely by anglers. Other expenses and 
boat fees varying by mode are computed simply as the sample average. It is noteworthy 
that the average cost of fishing from a charter vessel is considerably more than all other 
modes, and sometimes an order of magnitude more costly than the cost of shore fishing. 
The averages of the predicted prices for charter, private, and shore fishing are shown in 
table 4.2. 
 
TABLE 4.2 
Average Predicted Prices across Modes of Fishing 
Means Charter Private Shore 
Travel Cost and Opportunity Cost of Time 22.8 22.8 22.8 
Other Expenditure 17.5 29.6 7.2 
Boat Fee 222.5 - - 
Total Price 262.8 52.4 30.0 
 
The mode-site catch rates are the average of reported catch rates for each site and 
mode. When, for a given mode-site combination, only a few anglers report catch, the 
average reported catch could be problematic. As our sample is rather large, this was not 
a major problem, but when less than 20 observations were available, observations from 
adjacent site(s) were included until at least 20 observations were obtained.  In this way, a 
catch rate was available for each of the all sites and for each of the three modes. The 
averages of catch rates for charter, private, and shore fishing are 3.53, 2.71, and 1.71, 
respectively.  
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Estimation 
 The parameters of the model are estimated by maximizing the log likelihood function: 
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We assume that the decision whether to fish or not is a function of the season as 
captured by an intercept term and the season as picked up by dummy variables for the 
five waves: Dwave1 =1 if the respondent is surveyed in Jan-Feb,…, Dwave5=1 if the 
respondent is intercepted in Sep-Oct. The probability of not fishing or staying at home is 
also a function of  a dummy variable of targeting red snapper, Dredsn, boat ownership, 
Dboat=1 if yes, and the angler’s experience in years, Exper. In addition to an intercept 
term for each mode, α0m, mode choice is also assumed to be a function of CatchRatem. 
Income levels are identified in the dummy variables DM0=1 if household income is less 
than $35,000, DM1=1 if household income is $35,000 to $75,000, and DM2=1 if 
household income is greater than $75,001.15  Using the most general specification with 
separate slope coefficients for each mode and income category, the final empirical 
specification of the probability of not fishing and mode choice from equations  [4.11] 
and  [4.12] can be written as 
 
( )
5
7 8 9
1
1
0 0 0 1 1 2 2
exp exp
M
j jnf
ji
m
m m m m m mi
Dwave Dredsn Exper Dboat
CR DM DM DM P
α α α απ
α γ β β β
=
=
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− − − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥+ + − + +⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
∑∑  [4.14] 
                                                 
15 Note that the dummy variable trap is avoided because there no default coefficient.   
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and 
 
0 0
0 0 1 1 2 2
0 0 1 1 2 2 .
1
( )
( )
( )
1 exp
s m s m
f
mi s s s si
m m m mi
M
s
CatchRate CatchRate
DM DM DM P
DM DM DM P
α α γ
π β β β
β β β=
− + −⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥+ + +⎣ ⎦
∑ .  [4.15] 
Note that the intercept term, α0m, captures the difference between intercept in the 
non-fishing and mode-m utility function, i.e. 0 0m mα α α= −  in [4.5], [4.6], [4.8] or [4.9].  
With nfiπ  and fmiπ  defined by  [4.14] and  [4.15], the parameters of the unrestricted 
model are found by maximizing [4.4] with respect to the parameters. Equivalently, the 
restricted models, [4.5], [4.6], and [4.8], are estimated by making the suitable restrictions 
in the equations for V0ti and Vmti.  
 
Estimation Results  
Estimation results for participation and mode choice model are presented in 
Table 4.3.16  The alternative models associated with different specifications of the price 
coefficient are presented. We estimated four different models corresponding to equations 
[4.5], [4.6], [4.8] and [4.9], models 1 through 4. Only one price coefficient is used in 
model 1, mode-specific price coefficients are used in model 2, income specific 
coefficients are estimated in model 3, and both mode and income specific price 
coefficients are estimated in model 4. Our focus is here on testing the slope coefficients 
in the utility difference equations vary across both mode and income. Based on the 
                                                 
16 The standard errors that yield the t statistics in Table 4.3 are computed from analytic second 
derivatives (Newton) supplied by the econometrics program TSP. 
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likelihood ratio test, we reject at the 1% level all restrictions on the model.  That is, we 
reject the hypothesis that the price coefficient is constant across modes, [4.5]=[4.6], that 
it is constant across income levels, i.e., [4.5]=[4.8], or both of these restrictions 
simultaneously, [4.5]=[4.9]. Following our model specification tests, we focus the 
remainder of our discussion on the preferred and most general model, Model 4, in which 
the price coefficient is allowed to vary for each mode and income group.  
 
TABLE 4.3 
Estimation Results of Participation-Mode Choice Model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
One Price 
coefficient 
Mode-specific 
Price coefficients 
Income Specific 
Price coefficients 
Mode and 
Income specific 
Price coefficients 
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
α0Ch 3.3865 1.6558 3.4031 2.9852 
(Constant) (28.62) (23.73) (26.01) (23.60) 
α0Pr 3.9828 4.7467 3.9821 4.0196 
(Constant) (94.60) (54.05) (93.12) (51.07) 
α0Sh 2.6163 3.2589 2.6127 3.3132 
(Constant) (67.55) (58.40) (62.04) (55.17) 
γ 0.0473 0.0856 0.0467 0.0886 
(CatchRate) (4.86) (13.78) (4.72) (14.44) 
β0Ch  ?  0.0111 0.0061 0.0110 0.0085 
(Price Low) (27.79) (28.70) (19.39) (28.90) 
β1Ch  ?   0.0117 0.0079 
(Price Middle)   (25.95) (25.01) 
β2Ch  ?   0.0099 0.0070 
(Price High)   (20.96) (25.70) 
β0Pr ?  0.0307  0.0242 
(Price Low)  (17.45)  (16.56) 
β1Pr    0.0195 
(Price Middle)    (14.47) 
β2Pr    0.0205 
(Price High)    (12.96) 
β0Sh  ?  0.0419  0.0379 
(Price Low)  (19.88)  (16.13) 
β1Sh    0.0467 
(Price Middle)    (14.87) 
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TABLE 4.3  
Continued 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Parameter Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
β2Sh    0.0597 
(Price High)    (10.52) 
α1   0.2139 0.2129 0.2146 0.2157 
(Dwave1) (7.29) (7.27) (7.32) (7.36) 
α2  -0.2539 -0.2441 -0.2547 -0.2378 
(Dwave2) (-10.31) (-9.92) (-10.33) (-9.66) 
α3 -0.2641 -0.2561 -0.2660 -0.2553 
(Dwave3) (-11.34) (-11.00) (-11.42) (-10.96) 
α4 -0.1349 -0.1289 -0.1358 -0.1300 
(Dwave4) (-5.22) (-4.99) (-5.25) (-5.03) 
α5 -0.1125 -0.0988 -0.1130 -0.0935 
(Dwave5) (-4.67) (-4.11) (-4.69) (-3.88) 
α7 0.4891 0.4820 0.4968 0.4639 
(Dredsn) (5.72) (5.65) (5.80) (5.43) 
α8 -0.0011* -0.0015 -0.0011* -0.0015 
(Experience) (-2.22) (-2.89) (-2.21) (-2.87) 
α9 -0.1507 -0.1698 -0.1532 -0.1964 
(Dboat) (-9.96) (-11.16) (-9.88) (-12.58) 
Log Likelihood -26938.4 -26712.5 -26931.1 -26645.9 
Schwarz BIC 26991.8 26774.1 26992.7 26732.1 
Degrees of 
Freedom 3681 3679 3679 3673 
Notes: Variable names and t-statistics in parentheses.  Ch=Charter, Pr=Private, 
Sh=Shore, and Low, Middle, and High indicate income groups, respectively. All price 
terms enter the model with a minus sign, so a positive sign is consistent with the usual 
expectation of the price coefficient in demand models.  
* significant at 5%, all other estimates are significant at 1%. 
? In models 1 and 3 the price coefficients are not mode specific. In model 2 the price 
coefficients are for all income levels. 
 
The signs on the estimated coefficients for the prices are all negative and 
significant with exception of the charter price. They appear to be positive in Table 4.3 
because in estimation all are subtracted from other terms (see equation [4.9]). Hence, an 
increase in trip costs, such as through the imposition of a user fee, would be expected to 
lead to a reduction in the probability of using that mode. Comparing the price 
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coefficients across income levels, e.g., β0Ch, β1Ch, and β2Ch, we find relatively little 
difference, with the largest differences being within the shore angler mode group, where 
the high income category coefficient (0.06) is 37% larger than the low income category 
coefficient (0.038). Across the modes, however, there is striking difference in the 
responsiveness to price, indicating greatly different slopes depending on the mode of 
fishing. The charter coefficients are very small, but the private coefficients are about 
three-times larger and the shore coefficients are over two times larger than private ones.  
As we discuss in more detail below, these differences across modes indicate that anglers 
who participate in shore fishing are much more responsive to price changes than other 
fishermen.  
All mode characteristic constant terms in the mode decision (α0Ch, α0Pr, and α0Sh) 
are significant and positive, implying that anglers can get utility benefit from fishing 
trips. The positive estimate of the catch rate variable indicates that anglers will likely 
choose a mode that provides them with more catches. The coefficients in the probability 
of not fishing equation  [4.14], i.e., α0, to α9,   are also significant and give us 
appropriate interpretation. If the signs of these estimates are negative, it implies that 
anglers are more likely to going to fish instead of staying at home. For example, with 
negative signs of the experience variable and the dummy variable of owning a boat, 
more experienced anglers and/or anglers who own a boat will have higher possibility of 
taking a trip. 
Evaluating the estimated probabilities at the means of all explanatory variables, 
Table 4.4, the predicted number of recreational trips to the Gulf states and probabilities 
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of choosing modes by using the estimates are presented. The expected number of trips 
over the period are equal to 61×(1-πinf), and the expected trips for each mode are 
calculated by 61×(1−πinf)×(πmif). The probability of not fishing on any given day is 
estimated at 97.1 percent, on average. The number of trips that a representative angler 
would take to catch red snapper over the two-month period is estimated at 1.76 trips, and 
on average 1.15 of these would be from a private boat. Charter boat fishing is much less 
frequently done, with only 0.44 trips on average over the observed period.   
 
TABLE 4.4 
Predicted Trips per Two-Month Period and  
Daily Probabilities of Choosing Mode and Not Fishing 
Trips Total Charter Private Shore 
Mean 1.755 0.439 1.152 0.164 
     
Probability Not Fish Charter Private Shore 
Mean 0.971 0.094 0.656 0.250 
Note: Hereafter, all trips are defined as recreational trips to catch red snapper per two-
month period.  
 
 
The Effects of Income, Season, and Price on Trips, across Modes 
Using the estimated coefficients, we predicted the number of trips in each mode 
for the different income categories, i.e., low (L), middle (M), and high (H) income 
groups, in table 4.5  Notice that the demand for fishing trips actually falls slightly as 
income rises from a high of 1.79 trips/two-month period for people in the low income 
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group, to 1.68 trips for those in the higher group. Although one might expect fishing to 
be a luxury good (suggesting that trips rise as income rises), there are clearly other 
economic factors at play that are not captured in the model. The negative effect of 
income on fishing demand may be due to omitted choices. Thus, the set of feasible 
alternative recreational options increases as income rises. More noticeable are the 
differences in the modes chosen across income groups. Although we predict that 
individuals of all income will primarily take trips on private boats, only higher income 
people are predicted to prefer charter fishing, (0.157 (L) to 0.211(H) on average), while 
shore fishing is preferred by lower income people (0.555(L) to 0.265(H) on average). 
Hence, the model predicts substantial variability in choices made depending on income 
level.   
 
TABLE 4.5 
Predicted Trips per Two-Month Period and Daily Probabilities for Different Income 
Categories 
Average Predicted Trips Total Charter Private Shore 
Low 
Income less than $35,000 1.791 0.157 1.079 0.555 
Middle 
Income $35,001 to $75,000 1.782 0.163 1.237 0.382 
High 
Income greater than $75,001 1.678 0.211 1.202 0.265 
Fish  
(probability of each mode on a trip)Probabilities Not Fish 
Charter Private Shore 
Low 
Income less than $35,000 0.9706 0.088 0.602 0.310 
Middle 
Income $35,001 to $75,000 0.9708 0.092 0.694 0.214 
High 
Income greater than $75,001 0.9725 0.126 0.716 0.158 
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 The predicted number of trips and probability of not fishing across two month 
fishing periods are tabulated in table 4.6. The expected number of trips is the largest 
during the months of May and June. March and April are also preferred months and the 
least preferred fishing season is winter in the months of January to February. 
 
TABLE 4.6 
Average Predicted Trips across Waves 
Trip Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug Sep-Oct Nov-Dec 
Charter 0.116 0.182 0.185 0.164 0.158 0.144 
Private 0.894 1.398 1.422 1.257 1.213 1.106 
Shore 0.311 0.487 0.495 0.438 0.422 0.385 
Total 1.321 2.066 2.102 1.858 1.793 1.635 
 
 
Fee Impacts  
We now use the model to predict how fees can be used to reduce recreational 
fishing effort, which in turn, may reduce adverse impacts on the fishery.  Suppose a day-
based fishing permit fee were imposed on those who go fishing, equally charged to all 
anglers no matter what mode they use. Table 4.7 shows that the model predicts that 
fishing behavior would be quite sensitive to such an increase in the cost of a fishing day.  
We estimate that a $5 fee would lead to a 12% reduction in total fishing effort and a $20 
fee is predicted to reduce trips by 38% which is 1.1 trips every two months. Among 
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modes, charter boat fishing demand is least affected and shore fishing is most affected. If 
the fee is increased to over $15, the model predicts that half of the least expensive mode, 
shore fishing, will be eliminated. In contrast, the same increase in costs for charter 
fishermen has a relatively small effect. 
 
  TABLE 4.7 
Predicted Trips per Two-Month Period after Fee Is Imposed and Increases 
 Trips per two-month period 
Daily Fee Total Charter Private Shore 
1.7994 0.1583 1.2171 0.4240 
$0 
(0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) (0.0%) 
1.5850 0.1513 1.0949 0.3389 
$5 
(-11.9%) (-4.5%) (-10.0%) (-20.1%) 
1.4040 0.1449 0.9876 0.2715 
$10 
(-22.0%) (-8.5%) (-18.9%) (-36.0%) 
1.2504 0.1391 0.8932 0.2182 
$15 
(-30.5%) (-12.2%) (-26.6%) (-48.5%) 
1.1196 0.1339 0.8099 0.1758 
$20 
(-37.8%) (-15.4%) (-33.5%) (-58.5%) 
1.0076 0.1293 0.7364 0.1420 
$25 
(-44.0%) (-18.3%) (-39.5%) (-66.5%) 
Note: Percentage Declines in Parentheses. 
 
 The distribution of these impacts across the modes make intuitive sense; as a 
percentage of the trip price that they already face, a five dollar fee has much greater 
significance to shore fishermen than to charter fishermen. We find, therefore, that a price 
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instrument such as a fee and TRs to rationing would have the effect of favoring charter 
fishing, the pastime of the wealthy, relative to shore fishing which is the choice for the 
lower income anglers. 
 User fees are particularly attractive from an efficiency perspective because they 
restrict fishing opportunities in a way that those who value the resource most (in terms of 
willingness to pay) are the ones who end up using the resource.  Fees are more efficient 
than the current policy of closures and based on our results, we find that a user fee can 
be very effective in reducing fishing effort. However, we find that such a policy may not 
be desirable on equity grounds.  A flat fee will work by reducing fishing pressure by the 
lower income participants who use the least expensive mode, essentially excluding this 
group from access to the resource. Balancing efficiency and equity in practice is a 
challenge, but ignoring the issues either explicitly or implicitly through the choice of the 
model, will not make this challenge go away. 
 
Consumer Surplus 
Because our utility function is assumed to be linear in income (or budget) and 
catch rates, consumer surplus of taking a trip using mode m is equal to compensating 
variation (CV). If we assume taking a trip can not cause an individual to jump income 
categories, i.e., low income to middle income group, this welfare measure will be same 
as equivalent variation (EV). Our interest is in measuring how much an angler can 
benefit when taking a trip to catch red snapper using mode m. Expected per-day (per-
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trip) consumer surplus (CS) when an angler takes a trip using mode m is defined 
implicitly by the equation 
0( ) ( ),m m mU B P CS U B− − =   
and empirical expression using estimates is 
0( ) ,m mm m
m
CRE CS day Pα α γβ
− + ⋅= −  
where mβ  is price parameter for each mode m, and other parameters and variables are 
same as defined above. Gross per-day CS for mode m when an angler take a trip using 
mode m is approximate as 0( )m m mCRα α γ β− + ⋅ , and net per-trip CS can be measured 
by subtracting the cost of fishing from the gross CS. Because estimated marginal utility 
of income varies by income group, we can compute the welfare measures by both 
income group and mode. Per-day CS estimates calculated by using the estimated 
parameters for each mode and by evaluating variables at the mean are presented in Table 
4.8.  
 
TABLE 4.8 
Expected Consumer Surplus per Day across Modes 
Gross E(CS)/Day Net E(CS)/Day 
Income Group Charter Private Shore Charter Private Shore 
Low 398.2 179.5 93.6 135.4 127.1 63.6 
Middle 426.7 223.2 76.0 163.9 170.8 46.0 
High 479.7 211.5 59.4 216.9 159.1 29.4 
Weighted Average 418.3 201.1 82.8 155.5 148.7 52.8 
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Expected per-trip CS is biggest when a charter boat trip is taken while it is 
smallest when shore fishing is chosen in both gross and net terms. Whenever an angler 
takes a charter boat trips, he can get $156 for his welfare benefit. If an angler takes a trip 
using his private boat or fishes at shore, his welfare gain will be $149 and $53, 
respectively. The reason the difference of CS between charter and private boats is not 
significantly large is that the fixed (or sunk) cost of owning a private boat is not captured 
when we calculate the price. If we could appropriately add this fixed cost to the price of 
taking a private boat trip, the net CS for private boat trip would diminish.  
 
TABLE 4.9 
Expected Consumer Surplus per Day across Two-Month Periods 
Gross E(CS)/Day Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug Sep-Oct Nov-Dec
Charter 378.4 434.3 436.5 421.0 416.5 405.0 
Private 184.6 205.4 206.2 200.4 198.8 194.5 
Shore 73.9 84.3 84.7 81.8 81.0 78.8 
Weighted Average 167.3 187.1 187.9 182.4 180.8 176.7 
       
Net E(CS)/Day Jan-Feb Mar-Apr May-Jun Jul-Aug Sep-Oct Nov-Dec
Charter 115.6 171.5 173.7 158.2 153.7 142.2 
Private 132.2 153.0 153.8 148.0 146.4 142.1 
Shore 43.9 54.3 54.7 51.8 51.0 48.8 
Weighted Average 111.3 131.2 131.9 126.4 124.8 120.8 
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Because α0 captures seasonal dummy variables, CS can be measured for each 2-
month period (Table 4.9). If the marginal utility of income is constant over the range of 
the price change, mβ  for each mode m can be calculated by the weighted average of 
marginal utility by income category. When an individual take a trip in May and June, she 
can get the highest per-day CS for all modes. When taking a trip using charter boat, 
private boat, and at shore in this period an angler can get $174, $154, and $55, 
respectively. On the other hand, January and February are least desirable period because 
anglers obtain the smallest welfare gain.  
  
Concluding Remarks 
 Overfishing is a serious problem in fisheries throughout the world and there is 
increasing recognition that recreational as well as commercial fishing must be 
controlled. Standard economic logic suggests that limiting catch using a price 
mechanism would be more efficient than other rationing mechanisms. However, a price 
instrument, such as an access fee or a transferable right, would raise the price of fishing 
to all anglers.  Such a policy would clearly have more significance to those on the lower 
end of the income distribution than to those on the upper end.  Furthermore, a flat fee or 
price increase would also affect the types of modes equally, but the impact would differ 
widely. Compared to the normal costs of day trip, a small fee can amount to a high 
percentage tax on some modes and a relatively small tax on others.   
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 Using results from an econometric model that allows for differing price 
responses across modes and income groups, we consider the consequences of a per day 
user fee on recreational fishing in the Gulf of Mexico. The model used for this analysis 
is based on the approach taken by MSR (1991), which is appropriate when complete trip 
data are not available, but our model extends the MSR (1991) approach in that it allows 
the price coefficient to vary across incomes and modes. We find income to be an 
important determinant of mode choice. Our results indicate that a user fee would have 
much greater impacts on low income groups, than on higher ones and would affect low-
cost fishing modes much more than it would modes that are relatively expensive.  
We also compute per-day CS across modes and two-month periods. When an 
angler takes a trip using charter boat he will get the largest welfare gain. Per-day CS 
varies by seasons. A trip in May and June will allow anglers to have the biggest CS 
while a trip in January and February is lease preferable in terms of welfare measures. For 
the case of the recreational fishery of the Gulf of Mexico, we estimate a model that 
provides information that can help guide a policy based on both efficiency and equity. In 
the next chapter we will use this model in order to simulate the impact of a recreational 
TR program.  
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CHAPTER V 
SIMULATION ANALYSIS OF TRANSFERABLE RIGHTS 
PROGRAM 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a simulation model that will be used to 
conduct an economic analysis of transferable rights program aimed at reducing over-use 
of the Gulf of Mexico red snapper (GRS) fishery. The main focus will be on explaining 
general framework of how the TR program will be applied in the simulation analysis. A 
TR program can play a role in restricting the harvest of recreational red snapper 
fisheries, thereby increasing the red snapper stock to a level which will ensure its 
sustainability. A simulation approach is adopted to evaluate both biological and 
economic effects of the TR policy on the fishery. We will use the General Bioeconomic 
Fisheries Simulation Model (GBFSM) as a simulation tool. Because the model is under 
development as of November 2006, this chapter will serve to state how a submodel of 
the TR program will be constructed and present some preliminary results. An empirical 
model of representative anglers’ demand for TRs will be formulated, which then is 
incorporated into the GBFSM. 
This chapter has four objectives: (1) to develop a general framework and a 
simulation submodel to implement the TR program for the GRS fishery, (2) to show how 
we can assess the potential benefits or costs of moving toward a TR program in the Gulf 
red snapper fisheries in terms of total surplus, (3) to present how the TR market can be 
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simulated for various scenarios of TAC can be found, and (4) to provide some 
preliminary results from GBFSM with the incorporated TR submodel. 
 
Background  
To achieve the research objectives of this dissertation, a simulation approach will 
be adopted as the primary tool of analysis. A simulation model can be designed to 
account for the biological and economic interdependencies between two or more 
fisheries, e.g., red snapper fishery is closely related to shrimp fishery and other reef fish 
fisheries because bycatch problem occurs when other reef fish is caught and some 
instruments of harvesting shrimp fishery are used.  
The GBFSM is used to conduct the simulation analysis.17 The GBFSM was 
developed to predict how alternative management policies would affect annual crop 
fisheries (Grant et al. 1981; Isaakson et al. 1982). The simulation model and modified 
versions have been used extensively for analyzing the effects of management policies in 
the Gulf of Mexico (Blomo et al. 1978; Blomo et al. 1982; Grant and Griffin 1979; 
Griffin and Stoll 1981; Griffin and Hendrickson 1992; Griffin and Oliver 1991; Griffin 
et al. 1993).  The GBFSM consists of two main parts: a biological submodel and an 
economic submodel. The biological submodel represents the recruitment, growth, 
movement and mortality of shrimp and finfish. Mortality of shrimp and finfish is due to 
                                                 
17 This section is taken from the proposal of MARFIN grant #NA17FF2873, Griffin, W. L. and 
R. T. Woodward. 2002. “Bioeconomic Analysis of the Red Snapper Rebuilding Plan and 
Transferable Rights Policies in the Gulf of Mexico.” Texas A&M University, College Station. 
The authors, co-chairs of my committee, approved of my using the proposal. 
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both natural causes and fishing. In addition to harvests of shrimp and reef fish, effort 
targeted toward the shrimp also leads to incidental bycatch of reef fish. When a 
management policy is imposed on GBFSM, the biological submodel calculates the 
changes in days fished, number of vessels and landings of shrimp and red snapper.  The 
economic submodel then calculates the monetary impact on fishermen in terms of costs, 
revenues and rent for each vessel class in each area based upon the biological effects of 
the management policy implemented. GBFSM has also been modified to incorporate 
values for the consumers' surplus associated with the recreational fishery (Gillig et al. 
1998). 
The economic criterion used to judge a policy is based on the discounted total net 
economic surplus of the directed red snapper and shrimp fisheries. The larger the 
discounted total net surplus, the more preferable the policy is from an economic point of 
view.  Real discount rate rather than a nominal discount rate will be used to calculate the 
present value. The real discount rate refers to a nominal rate that has been adjusted to 
exclude expected inflation. To maintain consistency with prior analysis, the real discount 
rate to be used in this analysis is 7.0 percent, as suggested in the Guidelines and 
Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (1992).  
The discounted net total surpluses ( TNS ) is represented by the following 
equation, 
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TNS  is the sum of the discounted consumer and producer surpluses of the commercial 
and recreational red snapper fishery and the shrimp fishery for a given management 
policy. CSS t , CSCR t , and CSRR t  are discounted consumer surpluses of the shrimp, 
commercial red snapper, and recreational red snapper fisheries, respectively. SPS , 
CRPS and RRPS  are the discounted producer surpluses of the shrimp, commercial red 
snapper and recreational red snapper fisheries, respectively.  i is the discount rate which 
is 7.0 percent and t is the simulation time  period which goes from 0 to T years. 
A version of the GBFSM calibrated to consider policies affecting shrimp, red 
snapper, and other reef fish species is currently under development. This model will also 
account for various forms of recreational effort in the Gulf. Upon completion of this 
version of the GBFSM, the subroutines to simulate TR program will be incorporated into 
the main simulation model. The flow of the GBFSM is presented in Figure 5.1. Given a 
TAC from the policy sector of GBFSM, the TR subprogram will predict the number of 
trips by fishing modes, months, and species. Species are categorized by only red snapper 
and other reef fisheries. The TR submodel will return a new set of catchablility 
coefficient ( 1TRajmq ) into the current structure of the GBFSM that account for the fact that 
recreational fishermen can target red snapper throughout the year, though at a reduced 
intensity. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Flow Chart of Simulation Analysis for TR program 
 
In the rest of this chapter we develop the conceptual foundations for these 
subroutines and the assumptions that are used. We describe in detail the modeling 
approach that will be incorporated into the full simulation model. We also consider the 
possibility of trading TRs between recreational and commercial sectors when TR 
program is introduced to both sectors. Based on partial results of developed submodel, 
the TR program in the GRS fishery focusing highly on recreational sector will be 
evaluated. 
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Conceptual Model of Transferable Rights Program  
As we reviewed in chapter II, TR programs have been used in various areas to 
protect environment and resources. These programs specify a predetermined total level 
of quotas (permits) within a specified region. Permits equal to the permissible TAC are 
distributed among fishermen in the region. Such programs could include both the 
recreational and commercial fishing sectors. To ensure that such permits serve their 
purpose as incentives to achieve socially desired levels, total harvesting levels within a 
given region are limited so that the permits become valuable. Economic efficiency can 
be increased through trading of rights within the sector or across sectors. Our application 
is made to the red snapper fishery in the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
Transferable Rights Program in Only Recreational Sector 
In this section we elaborate how the recreational TR program works to achieve a 
given TAC goal. In simulations of the recreational sector, fishing trip demand is usually 
predicted as a function of travel cost. This demand can easily be converted to pounds of 
fish assuming for simplicity that catch rates and pounds per fish remain constant. The 
assumptions of constant catch rates and constant pounds per fish are obviously quite 
strong and ignore the fact that the behavior of the average angler may change as a result 
of the TR program. However, for lack of data on these behavioral responses and since 
we recommend that that bag limits be retained, our results can be thought of a first 
approximation of a TR program for the red snapper fishery. Traditionally recreational 
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catch limits have been achieved by closures and size and bag limits. However an 
equivalent reduction can be achieved using a price instrument.  
In figure 5.2, the aggregate demand of the TR permits is given by additional cost 
of trip (PTR), which represents how much anglers are willing to pay to take an additional 
trip. For example, if anglers are paying $100 to take a trip on average, the total quantity 
demanded will be decided at point C. We assume here that this results in an overfishing 
situation and that the catch needs to be reduced to Q* pounds to satisfy the TAC. This 
reduction can be achieved if anglers pay TRP  to purchase a TR permit at point A to 
achieve the TAC goal. 
 
 
FIGURE 5.2 
Recreational Transferable Permit Demand and the Substitution Effect 
 
$/trip 
Quantity(Trips)
TAC
$100+PTR A
 Recreational TR Demand 
C
Q*
$100+0 
B
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Because we consider a case in which there is a TR program only for red snapper, 
it is likely that implementing such a program will result in some degree of substitution 
away from red snapper. A substitution effect is defined as the percentage of anglers who 
will give up catching one species and switch their target to other species. With 
substitution effect, the demand curve in figure 5.2 will shift down and the possible 
optimum of the price of TRs will be decided between points A and B. Hereafter in this 
chapter the estimated demand curve will incorporate the substitution effect.  
Unfortunately, because most travel-cost data do not distinguish costs targeting red 
snapper from costs targeting other fisheries, no substitution effect between species is 
found in the standard recreation demand models (including that estimated in the previous 
chapter). The details of how we approximate a substitution effect for our simulation 
model will be explained below. 
 
Net Benefit of Transferable Rights Program 
Closures are mainly used for the current policy to manage the number of trips of 
the GRS fishery. As of 2006, the recreational season for GRS fishery is closed from 
January to April 20 and from November through December. This policy will lead to an 
inefficient outcome because, as we have seen in chapter II, recreational anglers demand 
to go fishing during the closed season. Under a TR program they can go fishing 
whenever they want with the permit purchased. Figure 5.3 presents demands with the 
substitution effect in both closed and open seasons.  
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We use the Marshallian demand to calculate welfare measures. Consumer 
surplus, which is a Marshallian measure, has dominated applied work because of the 
difficulty of obtaining Hicksian measures which are often called “exact” measures; 
utility functions are difficult to observe in the real world.   
Suppose a simple two-period demand system in which demand of trips in the first 
season is currently closed is presented in the left panel of figure 5.3. After implementing 
the TR program, an equilibrium price of PTR is reached leading to demand throughout 
the year.  For the previously closed season, area A will be the benefit moving from the 
closure policy to TR program. For the open season area C will be the loss because there 
will be an increase in the cost (PTR) to purchase the TR permit. The efficiency gain from 
the current closure policy to the TR program will be the area A-C. 
 
FIGURE 5.3 
Efficiency Gain of Transferable Rights Program 
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Transferable Rights Program in Both Recreational and Commercial Sectors 
Although some negative consequences of transfer of the rights between 
commercial and recreational sector are discussed in chapter II, allowing trading between 
sectors can lead to an efficiency gain. In this section we will explain why the efficiency 
gain by trading rights between sectors arises and how the new price and allocation are 
determined. 
With no tradable permit market, initial allocation of the TAC between sectors 
matters. Efficiency is only achieved if the TAC allocation is set such that the marginal 
benefit to each sector the same.  Before we move on to the full model of TR programs in 
both recreational and commercial sectors, we consider appropriate initial allocation of 
TR quotas (permits) between commercial and recreational harvesters to insure that the 
public’s resources are used efficiently. The main problem is how to allocate the TAC 
between two sectors. For economic efficiency, those who value the fish most should 
obtain more of the TAC. The values for the fish can be captured by demand such as trip 
demand and quantity demand. 
In the recreational sector, as we explored above, a recreational demand model 
can be used to derive the demand for the TAC. For the commercial sector, demand for 
the TAC is a function of the profits that can be obtained from the sector’s share. In the 
simplest case, considered here, the demand would be determined by the marginal profits 
that could be generated by the TAC, ( ) ( ) ( )qcqpq −=π , where q is the TAC allocated to 
the commercial sector, p(q) is the inverse demand curve for red snapper and c(q) is the 
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marginal cost of harvesting.  Even if c(q) is constant, the downward sloping demand 
curve will cause the sector’s demand for TAC to be downward sloping. 
Demand for a share of the TAC by each sector would typically be downward 
sloping so that an increase in the trip cost would lead to decease in fishing effort directed 
toward red snapper. Commercial and recreational demand relationships would capture 
how much the two sectors are willing to pay for a marginal increase in their share of the 
TAC.   Once the TAC is set, it can be interpreted as a fixed supply curve. 
Graphical representation to determine how we allocate the total TAC between 
two sectors is shown in figure 5.4. The negatively sloped curves of panel A to C are 
demand for two sectors, A and B, and an aggregate demand curve which is the 
horizontal aggregation of demands A and B. The point where the aggregate demand 
curve meets total TAC in panel C provides the marginal value of the TAC to the 
economy under an optimal allocation. Thus, this establishes a procedure for measuring 
total benefits, and a means of identifying the efficient allocation between the two sectors. 
The optimal allocation for sector A occurs at point a where the sector’s demand 
corresponds to the given level of cost, P*, obtained in panel C. In the same fashion, 
optimal allocation for sector B is determined at point d where demand meets P*.  
However, if the actual allocation for each sector is made at points b and c, then the result 
will be inefficient. In this example, sector A needs to have a smaller allocation and 
sector B needs to have a greater allocation to achieve maximum of total surplus. 
However, the result of allocation is dependent on the slope and intercept of each curve.  
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FIGURE 5.4 
Initial Allocation of TAC between Two Sectors 
 
Montgomery (1972) showed that the initial allocation of permits is not a 
significant problem under the tradable market system with assumption of zero 
transaction costs and a competitive market. With tradable permits a sector that wants less 
or more permits can sell or buy the permits to the others and the efficient allocation is 
reached. Figure 5.5 suggests how to allocate red snapper TAC between sectors. By using 
recreational and commercial fishing demand, we can predict the optimal allocation 
between two sectors under the TR program in both sectors. 
The lines in figure 5.5 depict the recreational and commercial demand toward 
quotas (permits) for each of the two sectors. The recreational demand is read from left to 
right and the commercial demand is to be read the other way around. In order to achieve 
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a TAC goal given to the recreational sector, recreational angers should pay $PTR to 
purchase a TR permit. Suppose the marginal cost to commercial fishermen is constant at 
C. Two possible demand curves are shown, one in which the choke price is high, 
H HP P C= − , and a second for a lower choke price, L LP P C= − . These different red 
snapper prices lead to the two demand curves for the TAC as shown with choke prices 
PH and PL. If the price of red snapper is high the equilibrium price per unit of the TR 
(PA) is above PTR, then commercial fishermen will want to buy more permits from the 
recreational sector. The maximum of permit transfer from recreational to commercial 
sector is QA. On the other hand, if the price of red snapper is low, the new equilibrium 
price of the TR is determined below PTR, commercial fishermen will sell their permits to 
recreational anglers rather than harvest red snapper. No matter what share of the TAC is 
initially allocated, both sectors can achieve the objective of maximizing the net benefit 
following the above mechanism to the equilibrium price in the permit market. 
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FIGURE 5.5 
Optimal and Actual Allocation of TAC between Sectors 
 
 
Submodel for Transferable Rights Program  
This section describes empirical issues that must be addressed to construct a 
simulation submodel of the TR program for the GRS fishery. Empirical representation of 
the recreational demand by fishing mode and assumptions that we use are introduced. 
An equilibrium condition will be shown under the TR program, and finally how to link 
the submodel of TR program to the main GBFSM will be stated. 
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Recreational Demand and Assumptions 
In chapter IV we estimate a discrete choice model of marine recreational fishing 
demand, allowing for differing price/fee responses across fishing modes and monthly 
seasons. This econometric model is an important piece of the submodel we develop to 
simulate a recreational TR program. The trip demand is directly equivalent to the day-
based TR demand as shown in the Chapter III. The number of recreational m mode trips 
in i month can be written 
{1 ( )} ( ) (1 ( )) ,nf fim i m m m TR ip p SR p DayTrip π π= − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅  
where  mp  is the price of trip, TRp  is the price of TR, 1- ( )nf mi pπ  is the probability of 
fishing to target the red snapper in i month, ( )fm mpπ  is the probability of taking a m 
mode trip estimated in chapter IV,18 SR(p) is the substitution rate switching targets from 
red snapper to other species, and iDay  is the number of possible fishing days in i month 
(e.g., 31 in January). 
The assumptions that we used to develop the TR demand are as follows: 
1. The recreational fishing trip demands and mode choice structures are same for all 
Gulf States.  
                                                 
18 Because the probability of taking a trip using m mode ( ( )fm mpπ ) does not vary by species, our 
econometric model overestimates the percentage of using private boat and underestimates the 
percentage of using head and charter boats. In case of red snapper for-hire boats are more likely 
used for recreational trips. In order to well predict the probability of taking a trip using each 
mode compared with the red snapper historical data, adjustment weights are used. Decision 
criterion for the weights was the seven year averages (1993-2001) of red snapper catches for 
each mode. 
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2. Because we estimate the demand for two-month periods we assume the 
probabilities of taking a trip in two months in the same wave as defined in 
chapter IV are same (e.g.,  ( )nfi mpπ  in  January and Feb is same). 
3. Because red snapper cannot be easily caught inshore we dropped shore fishing 
mode. Head boat trips are added because the GBFSM contains this type of mode 
(vessel class). 
4. We assume that the head and charter boats sectors are perfectly competitive so 
that all rents generated by the TR market accrue to the anglers.   
5. The substitution rate is same for all fishing modes. 
 
Demand of Head Boat  
Regarding the third assumption of the added head boat mode, we were forced to 
estimate head boat demand because the MRFSS data set does not include head boat trips. 
To approximate head boat demand, we use a weighted average between estimated 
coefficients of charter boat and private boat. Intercept and slope coefficients of charter 
and private boats are estimated in chapter IV.  
(1 )HB CB PBα γ α γ α= ⋅ + − ⋅ , and  
(1 )HB CB PBβ θ β θ β= ⋅ + − ⋅ , 
where HBα , CBα , and PBα are intercept parameters for head, charter, and private boats, 
respectively, and γ   is the weight of its parameter. Similarly, HBβ , CBβ , and PBβ  are 
slope (price) parameters for each mode, and θ  is its weight. The optimal weights (γ  and 
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θ ) were found by minimizing sum of squared error (SSE) of the percentage ratio of head 
boat, charter, and private-rental modes. We used average percentages of fishing efforts 
(trips)19 for 7 years and chose γ  and θ   to minimize SSE.  
( )2, ˆ ( , ; , ) mm m mmSSEγ θ π α β γ θ π= −∑ , 
where ˆ ( )mπ ⋅  is the predicted probability of taking a trip using m mode, and mπ  is the 
average of the probability of using m mode. Predicted parameters, HBα  and HBβ , that 
minimize the SSE will be incorporated into the recreational demand model. The demand 
model has three modes: head, charter, and private boats. 
 
Substitution Rate 
As noted above, because we consider a case in which there is a TR program only 
for red snapper, it is likely that implementing such a program will result in some degree 
of substitution away from red snapper. The substitution rate, SR(p), is defined as the 
percentage of anglers who will give up fishing red snapper and target other species 
instead. If SR is equal to zero there is no substitution effect. For example, if SR equals to 
0.1 then 10% of red snapper trips will switch into trips to target other species. In order to 
have the substitution effect in the model, we need a cross-price elasticity that tells us 
how the demand for trips targeting other species will change with respect to the price of 
                                                 
19 The GRS recreational fishing data are obtained from the National Marine Fishery Service 
(NMFS) MRFSS data, the NMFS Head Boat Survey data, the Texas Wildlife and Park 
Department, and the NMFS Southeast Regional Office.  
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taking a red snapper trip. Such cross-price elasticity is not estimated in our recreation 
demand model and we could not find this estimated elsewhere in the literature.  
However, we were able to estimate this variable using results from Gentner (2004).  
Gentner estimates target substitution elasticities for the catch rate changes in one species 
using the MRFSS data including the Gulf coasts. The cross-price elasticity is not 
available, but he does provide substitution of species with respect to the catch rate which 
we can build on to derive our cross-price measure. Gentner(2004) provides substitution 
elasticities with respect to catch rate as follows: 
1
% change in trips of other species
% change in catch rate of red snapper
ε= −  
2
% change in trips of red snapper
% change in catch rate of red snapper
ε= . 
From the prediction of our model, we can have the own price elasticity 
3
% change in trips of red snapper ˆ
% change in price of red snapper
ε= − . 
Finally, the cross-price elasticity can be written 
1
3
2
% change in trips of other species ˆ( )
% change in price of red snapper
ε εε
−= ⋅ − . 
Using this cross-price elasticity of trips in other species with respect to the price 
of red snapper trips, we can incorporate the substitution effect into the model and predict 
how much percentage of anglers who used to target red snapper would go fishing for 
other species if there is an increase in the price only for the red snapper. The substitution 
rate, which is a function of permit price ( TRP ), will be other1 3
2 RS
Q 1ˆ( )
Q TRRS
P
P
ε εε
⎧ ⎫− ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
, where 
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otherQ  is the number of trips for other species,  RSQ  is the number of trips for red snapper, 
and RSP  is the price of taking a trip for red snapper. These three variables are evaluated 
at the means. 
 
Commercial Demand 
As noted above, efficiency is increased if it is possible to trade TRs between the 
recreational and commercial sectors.  The problem is how precisely we can estimate the 
commercial demand. However, it would be quite difficult to estimate commercial fishing 
demand because it needs to be a multi-equation system demand model between species 
to reduce estimation biases. The commercial snapper demand was previously estimated 
by Park (1996) in his Ph.D. dissertation at North Carolina University using 1977-1992 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) data. The study analyzes six broad types of 
commercial fisheries: Groupers, Porgies, Snappers, Jacks, Tilerfishes, and Sea basses. 
As in previous versions of GBFSM, we adopt Park’s commercial snapper 
demand and its corresponding price flexibility as a proxy of the commercial red snapper 
demand in the Gulf. Following Park’s results from the synthetic inverse demand system 
(SIDS) model, the price flexibility of snappers is -0.0341. That indicates 1 % increase in 
red snapper landings would result in a 0.0341 % decline in its price. This price flexibility 
implies a highly elastic commercial demand, a result that seems inconsistent with 
observed price variation in the fishery in recent years. In light of this inconsistency, 
sensitivity analysis will be carried out with respect to the price flexibility.  
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Equilibrium Condition 
Following the above recreational demand model, we can then measure daily 
fishing trip demand which is a function of the travel cost by three fishing modes and 
months. Because the TAC is denominated in pounds, we need to convert the demand for 
days to pound equivalents. This is done assuming constant catch rates per trip, average 
pounds per fish and total number of anglers who fish in the Gulf coasts. Catch rates per 
trip and average pounds per fish for each mode (head, charter, private-rented boats) are 
calculated using 7-year averages of them (see footnote 19).  
The number of anglers is estimated by equating the predicted harvests based on 
our econometric model (trips×catch×anglers) and the 1997 reported harvests. The 
population of possible anglers (POP) is the reported harvests in 1997 divided by the 
predicted harvest per person per year.  The number of anglers in the Gulf is then held 
constant after 1997: 
 1997
2001
Reported Harvest
Predicted Harvest/person/year
,POP =  
At equilibrium, total landings should be equal to the given TAC by 
( ) ,im m TR m m
i m
P PTAC Trip CR AP POP
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪+ ⋅⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
= ⋅ ⋅∑∑  
where ( )imTrips ⋅  is the number of trips using m mode in i month, mP   is the average trip 
cost, TRP  is the price of a unit of TR, mCR is the catch rates of m mode, mAP is the average 
pound of red snapper for fishing m mode, and POP is the total population to take a trip 
in the Gulf coasts. Fishing modes for the index m are head boat, charter boat, and private 
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boat, and seasonal trips for the index i are measured by month from January (i=1) to 
December (i=12).  
An analytical solution of the price given the TAC could not be directly obtained 
because the demand function is highly non-linear. However, we can use Newton’s 
method to find a numerical solution of the marginal price corresponding to the given 
recreational TAC. Newton's method, also called the Newton-Raphson method, is a root-
finding algorithm that uses the first few terms of the Taylor series of a function (usually 
nonlinear). If we want to find a root of f(x), the algorithm can end up being applied 
iteratively to obtain  
1
( )
( )
n
n n
n
f xx x
f x+
= − ′ , (n=1,2,3……). 
The iteration process stops when ( ) ( )
n
n
f x
f x
− ′  is close to zero, so that nx  can be the root 
of the function. In our case, the root we want to get is TRP , so that our function is 
( ) ( )TR i m TRm m m
i m
f P P PTrip CR AP POP TAC
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= + ⋅⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
⋅ ⋅ −∑∑ ,  
and we want to find the solution of TRP  making the equilibrium condition hold by the 
algorithm, 
1
( )
( )
TRn
TR TRn n
TRn
f P
P P
f P+
= − ′ , (n=1,2,3……). 
If we find the marginal cost per pound is $1 for making recreational demand 
binding to the current TAC of 4.47 million lbs. for the GRS fishery, it implies a 
recreational angler needs to pay $1 per pound more to achieve the TAC goal.  
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Linking the TR Submodel with GBFSM through Catchability Coefficient 
In setting up GBFSM to analyze the TR policy for GRS fishery, a link between 
the simulation model and the empirically incorporated TR demand model should be 
developed to take account of the new policy. The TR program for GRS fishery will 
reduce total harvests of red snapper fishery but will increase those of other species 
because of substitution effects. These effects have been incorporated into GBFSM.   
In the GBFSM the catchability coefficients capture the extent to which effort 
from different vessel types lead to harvests.  These coefficients vary by fishing modes 
(vessel class), months, and age levels. Recreational harvest of j species in a age group 
can be defined as 
ja ajm m
m
h q T= ⋅∑ ,  
where m=mode, and mT =trips for all species by mode. Under the closure policy of red 
snapper fishery, the catchability coefficient, ajmq , is the weighted average of the 
percentage of open days (γ ): 
( ) ( )1 0 1 11 1 closedajm ajm ajm ajm j ajmq q q q q qγ γ γ γ= ⋅ + − = ⋅ + − , 
where  1ajmq  is the catchability coefficient when the season is open and 
0
ajmq is the 
catchability coefficient when it is closed. closedjq is an adjustment factor in the closed 
season and is a small number reflecting bycatch of red snapper. 
Under the TR program, γ  is always equal to one, meaning that we can go fishing 
for red snapper all days of all months. Hence, the impact of the TR program is captured 
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by computing a new value for 1ajmq  since a smaller portion of the trips will now target 
red snapper under the TR program. As the season is open for all other species as well as 
red snapper fishery,  1ajmq  is redefined as
20   
( ) ( )1 1 0 1 11 1 closedajm jm ajm jm ajm jm ajm jm j ajmq S q S q S q S q q= ⋅ + − ⋅ = + −? ? ? ?? ? ? ,  
where jmS? is the share of m mode recreational trips targeting species j  ( jm mT T ) when 
there is no cost of purchasing TR permit. 0ajmq? is the catchability coefficient for those not 
targeting species j. We assume that the catchability coefficient for those not targeting red 
snapper, 0ajmq? , is the same as the catchability coefficient when the season is closed, 
1closed
j ajmq q . This allows us to recover an intermediate catchability coefficient targeting  j 
species and using m mode, 1ajmq? ,  
( ) ( )1 11 11 1 1closed closedjm j ajm ajm jm jm
ajm ajm
jm jm
S q q q S q
q q
S S
⎡ ⎤− + − +⎢ ⎥= = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
? ?
? ? ? . 
However, since the new cost is added to purchase the TR permits in species j, the share 
of targeting species j ( jmS? ) will be decreased. Finally, under the TR program, new 
catchability coefficient will be written 
( )1 1 11TR TR TR closedajm jm ajm jm jm ajmq S q S q q= ⋅ + −? ?? , 
                                                 
20 Values of the variables with tilde such as jmS?  will be given by the estimated demand model 
and they do not exist in the GBFSM as of October 2006. 
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where TRjmS?  is the share of mode m recreational trips targeting species j under TR system. 
If the TR program is implemented only for the red snapper fishery, TRjmS? , j=red snapper, 
will decrease and  TRjmS? , j=other species, will increase because of both the substitution 
effect and the price effect. This also indicates that the catchability coefficient of the red 
snapper fishery under the TR program will decrease with different magnitudes across 
modes but that of other species will increase. By providing the new set of catchability 
coefficients with consistent way of the current GBFSM, the TR policy will be 
interconnected with the simulation model and be compared with other policies. 
 
 
Simulation Results from the TR Submodel 
In this section, we explore the impacts of the TR policy to reduce fishing 
pressure in the GRS fishery. The results in this section are preliminary and partial, based 
only on the TR submodel. Therefore the results that are presented in this section are 
obtained only by using the subroutine of the TR policy for a single period. In the next 
main section of this chapter, we present results from the model. We can, however, use 
these results to look at the consequences of a TR program on the head, charter, and 
private boats because of our allowance for the mode-specific demand. In addition, the 
impacts can be analyzed by month. Specifically, we examine the market clearing price of 
the TR which makes the recreational harvests exactly binding to the current TAC. We 
then simulate the model with various TAC settings. We also carry out sensitivity 
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analyses of policies for a variety of commercial net benefits to find out how much 
transfer will be made between recreational and commercial sectors. 
 
Recreational Market 
In table 5.1 we present the single-period simulation results supposing trading 
between the recreational and commercial sectors is not allowed. The market clearing 
price of the recreational per-day TR (PTR) would be $12.83 per day and the substitution 
rate would be 0.094. This means that recreational anglers should pay $12.83 to purchase 
a unit of day-based TR and about 9.4% of anglers who used to target the red snapper 
fishery will substitute their targets with other fisheries to achieve the current goal of 
TAC (2.57 million lbs) 21 . The market clearing price of the day-based TR can be 
converted to fish-based and pound-based TRs using the average catch rate and pound per 
fish simulated by the GBFSM, assuming, as we have discussed above, that these rates do 
not change in response to the introduction of the TR program. The market clearing price 
of the fish-based TR would be $5.02 per fish and on a pound-based TR would be $1.34 
per pound. We also measure an efficiency benefit of the TR program using the per-day 
consumer surplus as seen in figure 5.3. There would be $0.4 million benefit to the head 
boat sector, $3.3 million to the charter sector, and $8.6 million to the anglers who fish 
using private boats. The increase in the total surplus under the TR program would be 
over $12 million dollars. 
                                                 
21 The TAC of the western Gulf states is assumed to be 2.57 million lbs. based on 2001 landings.  
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TABLE 5.1 
TR Permit Price, Substitution Rate, and Benefit of TR Program 
 Price per trip Price per fish Price per pound Substitution Rate 
Price & SR $12.83 $5.02 $1.34 9.4% 
     
 Head Charter Private Total 
Benefit $428,212 $3,284,816 $8,628,343 $12,341,371 
 
Figure 5.6 reports the predicted impact on trips of the $12.83 cost equally 
imposed on all modes, as well as a percentage declines for each mode (in parentheses). 
Note that the percentage loss in trips over the period is highest among private boat 
anglers, as one might expect because their travel cost is lowest. The additional cost of 
$12.83 to purchase the TR is predicted to reduce by about 28% of the number of private 
boat trips. Charter boat anglers also reduce their trips by about 14%, though their 
response is not as substantial as for the other modes. 
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(-28.3%)
 
FIGURE 5.6 
The Predicted Number of Recreational Trips in GRS Fishery with the TR Program 
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The predicted number of recreational trips in a month under the TR program is 
shown in figure 5.7. Spring season from March to June is most preferable season but 
after the TR program is implemented the trips are distributed over all year with fewer 
trips in January and February. Notice that the trip demand in the current closure season 
is not trivial; allowing anglers to go fishing during the current closed season will create 
substantial welfare gains.  
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FIGURE 5.7 
The Predicted Number of Monthly Trips in GRS Fishery under the TR Program  
 
Table 5.2 shows the quantitative comparison under the different percentage 
declines of the TAC up to 50%. As the TAC is set to decrease, anglers will pay more to 
purchase the TR permits and will increase a degree of substitution of red snapper 
Closed Open in 2005 Closed 
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targeting trips away to other species. Our model predicts that a fifty percent decline of 
the TAC will require an angler to pay $43.4 to purchase a unit of day-based TR and 32% 
of anglers will change their targets to other species. Distributional impacts are also 
shown across fishing modes. The private boat sector would be most affected and the 
charter boat sector would be least affected. Also note that we predict substantial 
substitution to other species as the TAC is reduced and the TR price increase. 
 
TABLE 5.2 
Price of TR, Substitution Rate, and Harvests in Pound for Declines of TAC 
% decline 
of TAC 
Price of TR 
(per trip) 
Substitution
Rate 
Head 
(lbs) 
Charter 
(lbs) 
Private 
(lbs) 
TAC 
=Total Harvest
0% $12.83 0.09 351,210 689,789 1,529,031 2,570,030 
-10% $17.55 0.13 312,257 650,102 1,350,667 2,313,027 
-20% $22.81 0.17 273,553 607,722 1,174,748 2,056,024 
-30% $28.74 0.21 235,170 562,112 1,001,739 1,799,021 
-40% $35.51 0.26 197,210 512,541 832,267 1,542,018 
-50% $43.42 0.32 159,824 457,979 667,212 1,285,015 
 
Market for Commercial and Recreational Sectors  
We now consider the TR program of the commercial sector as well as the 
recreational sector of the GRS fishery. The sales price of red snapper from the 
commercial landings can be predicted based on the 2001 commercial revenue and 
landings from the reef-fish logbook data provided by Waters in National Marine Fishery 
Service and they are deflated to 1997 dollars using the GDP index. However, cost data 
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of commercial reef-fish vessels are rarely found. Waters (1996) reported some cost data 
for commercial vessels with vertical lines and bottom longlines based on the 1993 reef 
fish survey in the Gulf of Mexico. The high volume boats which have endorsements for 
the 2000 pound trip limit and are regarded as the major commercial vessels to catch red 
snapper are used to predict the per- pound marginal cost (MC). Cost data are also 
inflated to 1997 dollars. A sensitivity analysis is conducted under various price 
flexibility and per-pound MC settings of the commercial vessels.  
In this section, the equilibrium price is approximated using a two-step process.  
First the commercial profit per day is calculated, giving a reservation for that sector’s 
demand for the TR.  Then the change in the price for red snapper is calculated using the 
assumed price flexibility (either from Park 1996 or sensitivity analysis as discussed 
below). With this new red snapper price, a new price for the TR is set based on the 
average profit per day for commercial vessels. Finally, the associated demand by the 
recreational sector is calculated.  This will introduce approximation errors because the 
final TR price does not completely clear the market, though the magnitude of the error is 
directly related to the slope of the commercial red snapper demand curve. Since the 
demand curve used here is quite elastic, the magnitude of this error is probably 
inconsequential.   
Table 5.3 presents how many pounds will be traded from the recreational sector 
to the commercial sector when transfer between two sectors is allowed as shown in 
figure 5.5. If the MC of commercial vessels is low at $0.62/lbs, about 97 thousand 
pounds will be traded from the recreational sector to commercial sector. As the price 
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flexibility becomes high, the amount of transfer decreases. This also indicates that if the 
commercial TR demand curve becomes less elastic, the commercial sector will demand 
fewer TR permits. On the other hand if the MC is high at $1.85/lbs, the recreational 
sector will purchase TR permits assigned to the commercial sector. Clearly, the 
simulation results are quite sensitive to the actual profits being achieved by the 
commercial sector. 
 
TABLE 5.3  
The Amount of Transfer from the Recreational Sector to the Commercial Sector  
Under Different Price Flexibility and Per-Pound Marginal Costs 
Price Flexibility Marginal Cost 
($/lbs) -0.0341 -0.0682 -0.1705 -0.341 
$0.62 45,507 lbs 45,192 lbs 44,247 lbs 42,668 lbs 
$1.85 -260,258 lbs -259,801 lbs -258,432 lbs -256,152 lbs 
Note: Positive values indicate recreational sector sells and negative values indicate 
commercial sector sells. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the effect of the TR program on the catchability coefficients 
under the TR program. With the TR program implemented only in red snapper, 
catchability coefficients of red snapper will decrease but those of other fisheries will 
increase due to the substitution effect. These new coefficients will be sent to the main 
GBFSM and will be used to simulate biological impacts of the TR program. 
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TABLE 5.4 
Changes in the Catchability Coefficients with the TR Program 
 
 
A 10-Year Period Simulation Incorporated with the GBFSM 
We now use a 10-year simulation period to assess the long-term effects of a TR 
program and compare policy scenarios. Results in this section are computed after the 
subroutine of the TR policy is linked to the main GBFSM through a year loop. 
Biological effects are incorporated by taking the catchability coefficients and the number 
of trips for all fisheries back to the GBFSM. However, the results are limited to the 
western Gulf because the main GBFSM is calibrated for four western Gulf states (Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama). 
 
Recreational Market 
Table 5.5 presents the simulated number of trips and pounds landed under only 
recreational TR program over a 10-year period. The first row of the table presents the 
  Head Charter Private 
Without TR Red snapper & Other fishery 1 1 1 
With TR Red snapper 0.908 0.944 0.900 
With TR Other fishery 1.029 1.016 1.013 
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simulated values of the base year of 2001.22 The reason why 2001 is used as a base year 
is that the biological model tuned using 2001 data although price and cost are in 1997 
dollars. As the TR program is implemented only in the recreational sector, total pounds 
landed of red snapper shown in the last column would decrease but they do not match 
the TAC. This discrepancy arises because the simple actual catch model in GBFSM is 
more complicated than the linear model that is used to establish the changes in the 
catchability coefficients discussed above.  
 
TABLE 5.5 
The Number of Trips and Pounds Landing over a 10-Year Period  
Under Only Recreational TR Program 
  The number of Trips for all fisheries Pounds landing for red snapper 
Year TAC Head Charter Private Head Charter Private Total 
Base 2570030 65,750 367,329 1,157,812 414,226 667,071 1,488,733 2,570,030 
1 2570030 65,883 399,096 1,249,307 413,737 723,796 1,352,885 2,490,418 
2 2570030 65,843 392,511 1,241,416 418,780 715,951 1,360,445 2,495,176 
3 2570030 65,727 392,253 1,245,095 419,848 718,523 1,373,437 2,511,808 
4 2570030 65,591 391,969 1,249,467 420,101 719,317 1,385,991 2,525,409 
5 2570030 65,454 391,523 1,253,618 419,688 719,194 1,395,605 2,534,487 
6 2570030 65,319 390,951 1,257,553 419,035 718,523 1,402,716 2,540,274 
7 2570030 65,186 390,252 1,261,222 418,305 717,403 1,408,185 2,543,893 
8 2570030 65,058 389,420 1,264,564 417,588 716,004 1,412,902 2,546,494 
9 2570030 64,935 388,450 1,267,491 416,911 714,369 1,417,044 2,548,324 
10 2570030 64,819 387,332 1,269,965 416,298 712,552 1,420,613 2,549,463 
                                                 
22 The reason 2001 was used as the base year is that the biological model was tuned using 2001 
data. Prices and costs are in 1997 dollars. 
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As can be seen, the total pounds landed is moving toward the TAC over time and 
should, after many years, reach the actual TAC introduced in the model. Pounds landed 
by head and charter boats are predicted to increase. This indicates that anglers desiring 
for-hire trips are less willing to pay the additional cost and would buy permits from 
private boat users. The number of trips of all fisheries will increase for all modes in the 
first year of the TR program but will slightly decrease over the 10-year period. 
Table 5.6 shows the simulated producer, consumer, and total surpluses over a 10-
year period under the only recreational TR program. The producer surplus of the for-hire 
sector of head and charter boats is calculated by the revenues subtracted only by variable 
costs. After the TR program is implemented the total surplus for the first year is greater 
than that of the base year. The most surplus gains are generated in the producer surplus 
of the charter boat sector. The consumer surplus increases for the charter anglers but 
decreases for the private boat anglers.  
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TABLE 5.6 
Producer, Consumer, and Total Surpluses over a 10-Year Period 
Under Only Recreational TR Program 
Year 
Head 
PS 
Charter 
PS 
Head 
CS 
Charter 
CS 
Private 
CS 
Total 
Surplus 
Base 1,780,835 17,591,932 1,541,972 9,417,867 23,525,769 53,858,375 
1 1,784,427 19,113,293 1,544,830 9,574,310 23,425,854 55,141,396 
2 1,783,345 18,797,918 1,545,092 9,426,945 23,406,361 54,802,952 
3 1,783,921 18,793,986 1,545,050 9,424,147 23,408,584 54,803,079 
4 1,783,886 18,796,666 1,545,035 9,425,471 23,409,595 54,806,968 
5 1,783,859 18,797,107 1,545,027 9,425,723 23,410,164 54,808,060 
6 1,783,843 18,797,305 1,545,023 9,425,842 23,410,436 54,808,589 
7 1,783,836 18,797,451 1,545,021 9,425,922 23,410,553 54,808,889 
8 1,783,834 18,797,539 1,545,020 9,425,968 23,410,626 54,809,076 
9 1,783,833 18,797,598 1,545,019 9,425,998 23,410,682 54,809,205 
10 1,783,831 18,797,631 1,545,018 9,426,016 23,410,721 54,809,287 
Note: PS= Producer Surplus and CS=Consumer Surplus 
 
Market for Recreational and Commercial Sectors 
We now consider the case in which the TR program is now implemented in both 
recreational and commercial sectors. Table 5.7 shows the producer, consumer, and total 
surpluses over a 10-year period when the TR program is implemented in both 
recreational and commercial sectors and they are allowed to trade their rights. The table 
includes two subtables with different price flexibilities. In this case, the total surplus 
under the TR program would become smaller than that in the base year although the 
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surplus loss will declines with the greater price flexibility. The decline of total surplus is 
due to the fact that producer surplus in the for-hire recreational sector is a linear function 
of the number of trips taken by that sector. However that surplus is not reflected in 
demand for TRs.23     
 
TABLE 5.7 
Producer, Consumer, and Total Surpluses over a 10-Year Period 
Under Both Recreational and Commercial TR Programs  
1) With -0.0341 of Price Flexibility (Park 1996) 
Year 
Head 
PS 
Charter 
PS 
Head 
CS 
Charter 
CS 
Private 
CS 
Total 
Surplus 
Base 1,780,835 17,591,932 1,541,972 9,417,867 23,525,769 53,858,375 
1 1,763,370 19,087,158 1,514,909 9,224,565 22,866,189 54,456,191 
2 1,767,334 18,790,796 1,504,140 9,204,632 22,788,324 54,055,226 
3 1,758,581 18,766,709 1,494,266 9,188,193 22,741,414 53,949,163 
4 1,750,109 18,745,905 1,485,007 9,168,344 22,704,254 53,853,619 
5 1,741,884 18,715,889 1,476,270 9,145,231 22,673,266 53,752,540 
6 1,733,912 18,677,533 1,468,035 9,118,583 22,645,873 53,643,936 
7 1,726,222 18,630,559 1,460,474 9,088,321 22,622,285 53,527,861 
8 1,718,955 18,574,543 1,453,726 9,054,136 22,602,382 53,403,742 
9 1,712,220 18,508,601 1,448,027 9,016,441 22,586,655 53,271,944 
10 1,706,220 18,433,273 1,444,905 8,973,140 22,581,064 53,138,602 
 
                                                 
23 In addition, the estimated total surplus is an incomplete measure because commercial sector’s 
producer surplus is not included. The commercial sector’s producer surplus is not accessible as 
of November 2006 because commercial TAC is not linked to the main GBFSM. 
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TABLE 5.7 Continued 
2) With -0.341 of Price Flexibility (10 times larger than Park’s) 
Year 
Head 
PS 
Charter 
PS 
Head 
CS 
Charter 
CS 
Private 
CS 
Total 
Surplus 
Base 1,780,835 17,591,932 1,541,972 9,417,867 23,525,769 53,858,375 
1 1,764,685 19,088,804 1,516,759 9,227,578 22,900,774 54,498,600 
2 1,768,324 18,791,233 1,506,719 9,209,089 22,835,826 54,111,191 
3 1,759,990 18,767,977 1,497,488 9,193,838 22,800,684 54,019,977 
4 1,751,877 18,747,664 1,488,870 9,175,226 22,775,130 53,938,767 
5 1,744,015 18,718,270 1,480,763 9,153,406 22,755,506 53,851,960 
6 1,736,405 18,680,710 1,473,143 9,128,113 22,739,193 53,757,564 
7 1,729,071 18,634,730 1,466,163 9,099,254 22,726,100 53,655,318 
8 1,722,146 18,579,925 1,459,937 9,066,500 22,715,812 53,544,320 
9 1,715,719 18,515,445 1,454,676 9,030,207 22,708,413 53,424,460 
10 1,709,980 18,441,778 1,451,680 8,988,308 22,707,315 53,299,061 
Note: PS= Producer Surplus and CS=Consumer Surplus 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This chapter develops the theoretical foundation and the simulation submodel 
that will be used to conduct an economic analysis of the TR program. We elaborate in 
detail how the TR subprogram is introduced into GBFSM in order to simulate the 
policy’s effectiveness in reducing overfishing. Some partial results taken from the 
submodel of the TR program are presented. Because the TR program allows anglers to 
go fishing throughout the year, an efficiency gain moving from the current closures to 
the TR program would be substantial. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation contemplates how a transferable rights (TR) system could be 
designed for the use in a recreational fishery such as the Gulf red snapper fishery. 
Despite the increasing number of restrictions imposed on the Gulf’s anglers the total 
estimated recreational harvests still regularly exceeds the TAC allocated to the 
recreational sector. In order to overcome the recent overfishing situation TR programs 
are being increasingly considered in the recreational fishery. The primary objective of 
this dissertation is to develop a conceptual framework and an empirical model to analyze 
the possible use of a TR program for the recreational fishery.  
In chapter II, an overview of the conceptual framework was provided to 
investigate in more detail the issues of how a TR program might be implemented in the 
red-snapper recreational fishery. The existing regulations surrounding recreational 
fishery management were also reviewed. In addition, some lessons from hunting 
programs and other applications of TRs were introduced to find out preferable 
institutional schemes for the recreational TR program. We have summarized the issues at 
stake and present the advantages and disadvantages of alternative solutions.  
Chapter III presented a representative angler’s utility maximization problem. 
Analytical models of different units of measurement of TRs such as fish, day, and 
pounds were developed and comparative statics of decision variables which affect the 
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utility was carried out with respect to the permit price. However we could not confirm 
which unit of measurement would maximize a representative angler’s utility the most.  
The objective of chapter IV is to estimate an empirically based recreation 
demand that incorporates TR permit demand. Four model specifications were used to 
find a better model to estimate the recreational trip demand. We then examined a daily 
access fee-based policy as an approximate price instrument of TR program. We find that 
a fee can be very effective in reducing recreational fishing demand in the Gulf of 
Mexico. However, we also point out a price instrument such as a fee and TRs to 
rationing would lead to distributional consequences across modes. Our results indicate 
that a user fee would have much greater impacts on low income groups, than on higher 
ones and would affect low-cost fishing modes much more than it would modes that are 
relatively expensive.  
The main purpose of chapter V is to develop a conceptual framework of a 
simulation submodel of the TR program. The assumptions that are used to build the 
individual and aggregate TR demand were carefully described. We provide a conceptual 
foundation to explain how the market clearing price of the TR is determined and how the 
TR program works to allocate permits not only within one sector but also between 
recreational and commercial sectors. Because the main GBFSM is under development, 
only partial and preliminary results taken from the submodel of the TR program are 
presented. Although anglers would need to pay additionally to purchase the TR permits, 
we find that an efficiency gain moving from the current closures to the TR program 
would be substantial.  
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This dissertation initially reviewed the critical issues in the implementation of the 
TR program in a recreational fishery.  Although the use of TRs in recreational fisheries 
is a relatively new idea, we believe that it is an idea that has a great deal of merit and the 
institutional barriers are not insurmountable. We think that trading being carried out on 
the Internet or electronic systems with relatively low transaction costs would be the key 
to reduce these barriers. Should transferable permits become legal, they offer the 
potential to increase overall economic efficiency in both commercial and recreational 
fisheries by making it possible for the fishermen who value the resource the most to 
harvest the fish. We find that the trip demand in the current closed season is not trivial so 
that the TR program, which makes restricted entry unnecessary, would create a 
considerable benefit. As with other price instruments, the TR program will more 
significantly affect the poorest (or low-cost) user groups.  
As is often the case with newly promising policies, there are caveats in this 
dissertation. First, this dissertation could not show which unit of measurement for the 
rights is preferable in terms of maximizing anglers’ utility. We propose the day-based 
permit because it is a relative advantage in terms of controlling and enforcement of the 
use of the TR permits. However, more precise investigation should be provided 
theoretically and empirically to answer this question. Second, associated with the first 
caveat, this dissertation assumes constant the catch rate and average pound per fish when 
converting the impact of a day-based permit into quantity of fish harvested. This 
assumption is problematic. Inevitably, if a day-based TR program were introduced catch 
rates would increase as anglers try to get “more for their money” and more experienced 
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anglers tend to purchase the rights.  Hence, this assumption would lead to biased results 
because a change in price would affect the number of fish caught or landed. Estimating 
the extent to which these rates would change endogenously, is a conceptual and 
empirical challenge that we have not attempted to resolve in this work. The third caveat 
is that the simulation results are partial and preliminary only for the western Gulf of 
Mexico, and an equilibrium price for both commercial and recreational markets is also 
approximated using a two-step process. A complete analysis could be conducted 
following the general framework and submodel that this dissertation already provided.  
Suggestions for the future research are closely associated with further simulation 
analysis. Once a fully calibrated simulation model is accessible and the subroutine of the 
TR program is successfully linked to the main model, the TR program can be compared 
with a suite of other policy alternatives in terms of economic and biological aspects. 
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APPENDIX 1 
MATHEMATICAL PROOF FOR CHAPTER III 
 
First, define ( ) 0l tA kα α= ⋅ + > , 22 2 0l tB kβ β= ⋅ + < ,  and ( ) 0dC c α= − <  . The 
signs of A, B, and C can be derived from the optimal solutions for decision variables. 
The condition where total amounts of fish landed are same leads to the price relationship 
between  and f dP P . 
* * * * * * * * or ( ) ( )f f f f f f d dd l d l d k t d k t⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅
2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2
f f d d
d f d f d
C B P k A P k C A C P A
B P k B P k B
β
β β β
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⎛ ⎞+ −⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
2 2 2
( ) ( 2 ) ( )
(2 ) 2
f f d d
d f d
C B P k A P k C A A C P
B P k B
β
β β
⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ − +=⋅ − ⋅ ⋅  
The price of day-based permit which makes total amount of fish landed between two 
unit alternatives equal becomes: 
 
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( 2 )
.
(2 )
d f f d
d
d f
B C B P k A P k C A
P C
A B P k
β β
β
− ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅= −⋅ ⋅ − ⋅   [A-1] 
Note that * * and d dl t  do not include dP . The signs of differences between 
* * and f dl l , and 
between * * and f dt t  are demonstrated in [A-2] and [A-3].  
 
2
* *
2 2
2
2
f d
l f d
d f
P k C k A k AD l l
B P k B
β
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⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅= − = −⋅ − ⋅   [A-2] 
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Because *ft  is less than 
*
dt  as shown in equation [A-3], the sign of 
*
*
f
d
t
t
 should be less than 
1. Consequently, dD  should be positive. Finally, the utility difference between two unit 
alternatives can be written 
   U f dD u u= −   [A-5] 
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The sign of UD  is ambiguous. 
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APPENDIX 2 
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF HEDONIC WAGE FUNCTION 
 
Dependent Variable: HR_WAGE   
Method: Least Squares   
Included observations: 1663   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.634138 4.656740 0.136176 0.8917
AGE 0.779103 0.203294 3.832390 0.0001
AGE2 -0.007057 0.002479 -2.846805 0.0045
WHITE 1.654453 1.504920 1.099363 0.2718
MALE 4.111645 1.324988 3.103157 0.0019
DWAGE -11.63140 0.800576 -14.52878 0.0000
R-squared 0.159936     Mean dependent var 18.19456
Adjusted R-squared 0.157401     S.D. dependent var 17.23988
S.E. of regression 15.82504     Akaike info criterion 8.364665
Sum squared resid 414965.4     Schwarz criterion 8.384207
Log likelihood -6949.219     F-statistic 63.09376
Durbin-Watson stat 0.089204     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
Note:  HR_WAGE=hourly wage. 
 AGE=respondents’ age. 
 AGE2=Age squared. 
 WHITE=an ethnical dummy variable if white=1, otherwise=0. 
 MALE= A gender dummy variable if Male=1, otherwise=0 
 Dwage is a dummy variable if hourly wage = 1 , salary/2000=0. 
 The estimator of Dwage is highly significant and negative. 
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